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RIGHTS TO OFFICIAL TIME
FOR UNIONS
REPRESENTING FEDERAL
EMPLOYEES
Carlton J. Snow*

Elliott M. Abramson**
The concept of official time, which permitsfederal employee negotiatorsto bargain collectivel and simultaneouslyreceivepay,is an integralpart oflabor relations
in thefederal sector. It helps to bridge the economic gap betweenfederal agencies
and unions, thusfacilitatingmore constructive bargaining. This Article surveys the
historicalunderpinnings of official time, tracingits development from 1962 to the
present. Reimbursement of travel andper dtem expenses, an important subset of
official time, is also considered Special emphasis isplacedon the Supreme Court's
recent ruling on the issue, and the controversyfollowing it. The author critically
evaluates the official time question andpresentsrecommendationsfor enhancingthe
contributionof official time to federal sector labor relations.

INTRODUCTION

DURING THE LAST five years, the concept of official time has

become a potent force in the federal sector, prompting important changes in labor-management relations. For federal organizations, official time is paid time off from regular work duties to
participate in collective bargaining as well as other representa-

tional activities associated with the labor relations process.' Although ostensibly simple, this idea has a complex history and has
provided the impetus for a shift in the balance of power between

labor and management.
Until 1978, federal employee representatives had to take an-

nual leave time or leave without pay to participate in negotiations,
unless their labor contract granted them official time. Management negotiators, on the other hand, not only received official
* Professor of Law, Willamette University. A.B., Taylor University (1960); M. Div.,
Fuller Theological Seminary (1965); M.A., University of Wisconsin (1966); J.D., University
of Wisconsin (1969).
** Professor of Law, DePaul University. A.B., Columbia University (1960); J.D.
Harvard University (1963).
1. See 5 U.S.C. § 7131 (1982).
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time for all negotiation activities but also received reimbursement
for their travel and per diem expenses. This imbalance enabled
management to capitalize on the union's weak financial position
to encourage concessions. With passage of the Civil Service Reform Act of 19782 the disparity apparently was eliminated.
Under Title VII of the Act, a federal employee representative
obtained the right to 100% of official time for most collective bargaining activities.3 Moreover, for the first time, collective bargaining received congressional recognition as making an important
contribution to the public interest. In 1979, the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA), the body empowered to administer the
Act, issued an Interpretationand Guidance4 allowing 100% of official time for almost all contract negotiation activities. The Interpretation also required federal agencies to reimburse union
representatives for their per diem and travel expenses, thus eliminating the financial advantage traditionally held by management
negotiators.5 With relative equalization of bargaining power, the
dynamics of labor relations in the federal sector was altered
significantly.
Perhaps one of the most notable controversies wrought by
changes in the official time concept was the travel and per diem
question. Until the most recent Supreme Court Term, the sharp
division among the circuit courts of appeals addressing the issue
exacerbated the uncertainty surrounding the problem.6 However,
in Bureau ofAlcohol, Tobacco & Firearmsv. FLRA ,7 the Supreme
Court resolved the circuit split, holding unanimously that the
FLRA improperly required federal agencies to reimburse union
negotiators for their travel and per diem expenses.8
Official time, and more specifically the issue of travel and per
diem expense reimbursement, are inextricably bound up in the
matrix of executive orders, legislation, administrative directives,
and court decisions which has guided federal sector labor relations for the past two decades. In its initial foray into the official
time area the Supreme Court recognized as much, relying on a
2.
(1982)).
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.
See infra notes 94-104 and accompanying text.
2 F.L.R.A. 264, F.L.R.A. No. 31 (1979).
See infra notes 120-35 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 143-207 and accompanying text.
104 S. Ct. 439 (1983).
Id. at 441.
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variety of these factors to decide Bureau of Alcohol.9
This Article examines the concept of official time from its inception in a 1962 Executive Order and traces its development to
1978.10 Next is an analysis of the changes engendered by the Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978 and a discussion of the FLRA's Interpretation and Guidance construing section 7131 of the Act. 1 A
review of the Interpretation'smixed reception in the federal circuit
12
courts of appeals and its rejection by the Supreme Court follows.
The Article also considers recent reaction to the Court's decision
in Bureau ofAlcohol.1 3 Finally, the Article discusses the broader

concept of official time, as interpreted by the FLRA, and ponders
the potential contributions of official time to federal labor
relations. 14
I.

ORIGINS OF THE OFFICIAL TIME CONCEPT

A. Prelude: The Executive Order Era
In January 1962, President Kennedy issued Executive Order

10,988, which brought sweeping changes to labor-management relations in the federal sector. 5 Primarily a conceptual outline of
basic rights, the Kennedy Order gave federal employees the right

to form employee labor organizations and bargain collectively
with their employers. 6 Under this Executive Order, the granting
of official time to employee representatives was solely within an
agency's discretion. t7
Interpreting Order 10,988, the Comptroller General issued a
9. See infra notes 211-22 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 15-91 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 94-128 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 143-222 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 250-74 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 275-321 and accompanying text.
15. Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1962) (1959-63 Compilation), reprinted in
1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4269.
16. See Coleman, The CivilService Reform Act of1978: Its Meaning and Its Roots, 31
LAB. L.J. 200, 201 (1980).
17. Section 9 of Executive Order 10,988 provided:
Solicitation of memberships, dues, or other internal employee organization
business shall be conducted during the non-duty hours of the employees concerned. Officially requested or approved consultations and meetings between
management officials and representatives of recognized employee organizations
shall, whenever practicable, be conducted on official time, but any agency may
require that negotiations with an employee organization which has been accorded
exclusive recognition be conducted during the non-duty hours of the employee
organization representatives involved in such negotiations.
Exec. Order No. 10,988, § 9, 3 C.F.R. 521, 525 (1959-63 Compilation), reprinted in 1962
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4269, 4272.
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decision in July 1966, authorizing "administrative leave"' 8 for
employee representatives. 9 The decision stated that administrative leave could be granted to an employee representative "to attend union conducted training sessions designed to inform
employees on the scope and basic provisions of Executive Order
10,988 which are of mutual concern to the agency and the employee organization."" ° Agencies could grant administrative leave
when the training program dealt with matters such as "'statutory
or regulatory provisions relating to pay, working conditions, work
schedules, employee grievance procedure, performance ratings,
adverse action appeals, as well as agency policy and negotiated
agreements pertaining thereto.' ",z The Comptroller General,
however, announced two restrictions on granting leave for training sessions: (1) the primary purpose of the session must not be
to train or inform the employee" 'concerning solicitation of memberships and dues, other internal organization business, or representation of the employee organization in the art of collective
bargaining negotiations,' since such matters are not in the interest
of the government"; and (2) the agency may grant administrative
leave only for such short periods of time-ordinari not to exceed
eight hours-as are reasonable under the circumstances.22
On October 29, 1969, President Nixon signed Executive Order
11,491, effective January 1, 1970, superseding Kennedy Order
10,988.23 As originally promulgated by President Nixon, section
20 of Executive Order 11,491 explicitly prohibited granting official
time for collective bargaining and internal union activities.24 One
year later President Nixon signed Executive Order 11,616, amend18. The term "administrative leave" is used interchangeably with "official time" in the
federal labor relations context.
19. See Comptroller General Clarfies Use of Administrative Leave to Attend Union
Training Sessions, [July-Dec.] GOV'T EMPL. REL. RE1. (BNA) No. 151, at A-3 (July 12,
1966).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at A-4.
23. Exec. Order No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R. 861 (1969) (1966-70 Compilation), reprintedin
1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2948.

24. Section 20 of Executive Order 11,491 as originally enacted provided: "Solicitation
of membership or dues, and other internal business of a labor organization, shall be conducted during the non-duty hours of the employees concerned. Employees who represent a
recognized labor organization shall not be on official time when negotiating an agreement
with agency management." Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 20, 3 C.F.R. 861, 873 (1966-70
Compilation), reprintedin 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2948, 2957.
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ing section 20.25 The new Order allowed an agency and a union
to agree to a reasonable amount of official time for union representatives in contract negotiations. Specifically, the modification
permitted the parties to authorize as much as forty hours of official time or one-half of the time spent in negotiations during
working hours. 6
Because of its restrictive orientation, section 20 was used initially to limit the amount of official time that could be authorized.
For example, in Department of the Navy and Department of the
Army, the Federal Labor Relations Council (FLRC)2 7 set aside
the Assistant Secretary's findings that the agencies had committed

an unfair labor practice by refusing to grant official time to union

witnesses at unit determination hearings. 28 The FLRC noted that
the protected right of employees to engage in or refrain from

union activity "can hardly be deemed to import a duty of assistance to employees by management."29 Even though management
representatives who appeared on behalf of the agency did so in
their official capacity on official time, the FLRC concluded that
"it does not follow. . . that the refusal to grant the same right to

union

witnesses
30

constitutes

improper

'discriminatory'

treatment.

25. Exec. Order No. 11,616, 3 C.F.R. 605 (1970) (1971-75 Compilation), reprintedin
1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2578.
26. Executive Order 11,616 amended § 20 to provide:
Solicitation of membership or dues, and other internal business of a labor organization, shall be conducted during the non-duty hours of the employees concerned.
Employees who represent a recognized labor organization shall not be on official
time when negotiating an agreement with agency management, except to the extent that the negotiating parties agree to other arrangements which may provide
that the agency will either authorize official time for up to 40 hours or authorize
up to one-half the time spent in negotiations during regular working hours, for a
reasonable number of employees, which number normally shall not exceed the
number of management representatives.
Exec. Order No. 11,616, 3 C.F.R. 605, 608 (1971-75 Compilation), reprintedin 1971 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2578, 2579.
27. Secton 4 of Executive Order 11,491 established the Federal Labor Relations
Council (FLRC) to administer the Order, hear unfair labor practice complaints, and decide
questions of negotiability. The Council was composed of the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Secretary
of Labor. Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 4, 3 C.F.R. 861, 864 (1966-70 Compilation), reprinted
in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2948, 2950-51.
28. Department of the Navy and United States Naval Weapons Station, Yorktown,
Va., 1 F.L.R.C. 490, F.L.R.C. No. 72A-20 (1973); Department of the Army, Reserve Command Headquarters, Camp McCoy, Sparta, Wis., 102nd Reserve Command, St. Louis,
Mo., 1 F.L.R.C. 497, F.LR.C. No. 73A-18 (1973).
29. Department ofthe Navy, 1 F.L.R.C. No. 72A-20 at 493 (emphasis in original).
30. Id
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The FLRC found that while the purpose of Executive Order
11,491 was to provide employees an opportunity to participate in
the formulation and implementation of policies affecting employment, the Order did "not reflect a policy of 'encouraging such relationships.' ",3' The FLRC did find, however, that if the Assistant
Secretary determined that there was a need for union witnesses to
testify at hearings, he could promulgate an official time requirement by regulation. 32 In other words, the parties could not authorize the official time by agreement. However, once the unit
determination hearing was set, the Assistant Secretary could require the attendance of union witnesses. He then could order the
agency to pay the witnesses as if they were on duty.33
Through the negotiation process, the parties gradually opened
the door to broader interpretation of the section 20 official time
provision. The FLRC did not interfere with collective bargaining
agreements permitting official time for contract administration activities, such as participation in grievance discussions, third party
proceedings, and discussions with management relevant to the administration of the agreement. Relying on the statutory construction aid of expressio unius est exciusio alerius,3 4 the FLRC, in a
policy statement regarding official time, 5 found that section 20
prohibited only the use of official time for internal union business.
Thus, official time appropriately could be used for any other activities associated with labor-management relations and of "mutual
interest to both the agency and the labor organization. '36 Grievance discussions were specifically found to benefit both the agency
and the labor organization because they helped maintain a constructive and cooperative relationship between the parties, thereby
31. Id.
32. Id. at 494-95; see also Social Sec. Admin., Bureau of Hearings & Appeals v.
American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 3615, 8 A/S.L.M.R. Dec. & Rep. 472,
A/S.L.M.R. No. 1028 (1978). In Social Security Administration, the ALJ granted official
time to a union representative for the representative's two-day appearance at an unfair
labor practice proceeding. The Assistant Secretary noted that absent an exception filed by
the agency, the ALJ's ruling would not be overturned. However, the Assistant Secretary
added that under § 206.7(g) of his regulations, only necessary witnesses must be granted
official time for participation in unfair labor practice hearings. 8 A/S.L.M.R. No. 1028 at
472 n.2.
33. Department of the Navy, 1 F.L.R.C. No. 72A-20 at 495.
34. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a maxim of statutory interpretation meaning
that "the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLAcK's LAW DIcTIONARY
521 (5th ed. 1979).
35. Interpretation and Policy Statement, 3 F.L.R.C. 874, F.L.RC. No. 75P-I (1975).
36. Id. at 874.
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promoting the purposes of Executive Order 11,491.17 The parties,
therefore, could agree to authorize official time for union representatives engaged in grievance discussions within the time limits
of section 20.
In early 1976, the United States Dependents Schools, the European Area, and the Overseas Federation of Teachers negotiated
an official time provision. 3 The parties agreed that the union representative, a mathematics teacher, would be excused and placed
on administrative leave for half of each day during the school
year, and would be granted leave without pay for the other half of
each day so that he could devote full time to labor-management
activities. 39 According to the provision, the teacher was to serve
as the union representative for the entire three-year term of the
agreement. He would receive half of his government salary for
the period but would not be required to teach a single class during
that time. The Army challenged the contract provision, contending that it violated the official time provisions of section 20.40
The Overseas Federation of Teachers explained that the union
representative needed the agreed upon amount of time for handling grievances, appeals, and complaints, attending meetings
with management officials, and preparing union responses to
agency directives.4 ' There were three military departments involved in the agreement and almost 1,000 bargaining unit members scattered over an area two and one-half times the size of the
United States. Moreover, the unit members were subject to three
to six levels of administrative control. Therefore, the union representative, while still technically a mathematics teacher, needed to
spend all of his working hours on union management business in
order to accomplish his task.4 2
The Comptroller General asked the FLRC for its recommendations before rendering a decision. Consistent with its procedural
rules, the FLRC solicited the Department of Defense's view. The
37. Id.
38. See Comp. Gen. Ruling Limiting Offical Time for Union-Management Business,
[Jan.-June] Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 646, at G-1 (Feb. 23, 1976) [hereinafter
cited as Feb. 23, 1976 Comp. Gen. Ruling]; see also Tobias, The Scope of Bargainingin the
FederalSector: Collective Bargainingor Collective Consultation, 44 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
554, 570-71 (1976) (discussing facts of and Comptroller General's ruling in Overseas Federation of Teachers).
39. Feb. 23, 1976 Comp. Gen. Ruling, supra note 38, at G-1.
40. Id.
41. Id. at G-2.
42. Id.
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Department of Defense found nothing illegal in the agreement
since the contract authorized payment for only half of the actual
time spent on negotiations. Furthermore, the Department of Defense found that the reasonableness of the provision was a matter
for the parties to determine at the bargaining table.4 3 The FLRC
determined that none of the activities listed by the Federation involved internal union activities. To the contrary, the FLRC found
that all of the activities the union representative intended to pursue benefited both the agency and the labor organization, thus effectuating the purposes of Executive Order 11,491. For these
reasons, both the Department of Defense and the FLRC recommended approval of the provision, asserting that it was for the
parties to decide whether one person would devote all of his working time to representation matters or whether several employees
would share the work.'
Despite the recommendations, the Comptroller General ruled
that an agreement permitting an employee to be away from his
official governmental position for an extended period of time substantially interfered with agency functions and the performance of
the representative's official duties. 45 The Comptroller General
concluded that no employee would be allowed to spend more than
160 hours per year engaged in representational activities; 46 however, he did not explain how he arrived at a maximum of 160
hours. Recognizing that his decision would affect all existing labor agreements, the Comptroller General allowed a ninety-day
transition period so that agencies and unions could make arrangements to comply with the decision.4 7
This decision sparked so much controversy that one month
later the Comptroller General announced that he had decided to
suspend enforcement of the decision with regard to existing collec43. Id. at G-1.
44. Id. at G-2.
45. Id. at G-3. The Comptroller General stated:

[We are of the opinion that departments and agencies may only permit their
employees to devote such time to the performance of representational duties as

will not substantially interfere with the performance of the duties of their official
positions. While it is impracticable to establish rigid guidelines governing the
maximum amount of time that any individual employee may devote to representational duties, we believe that no employee should be allowed to spend more
than 160 hours per year engaged in such activities.
Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.

OFFICIAL TIME

tive bargaining agreements until October 1, 1976.48 He advised,
however, that a final decision would be applicable to any new
49
contracts negotiated before October.
By September 15, 1976, the Comptroller General had retreated
even further from his decision. He abandoned his proposed maximum of 160 hours of official time per year for union representatives.5 0 Using guidelines proposed by the Civil Service
Commission, the Comptroller General declared that "[t]he
amount of official time is to be determined by balancing the impact on employee performance and efficiency, effective conduct of
the Government's business, and rights of employees to be
represented.""
Unfortunately, the decision failed to define what was meant by
"employee performance and efficiency," "effective conduct of the
Government's business," or "rights of employees to be represented." Further, the decision did not indicate how the agencies
were to quantify these three factors to determine a reasonable
amount of official time. However, the Comptroller General did
suggest that the Civil Service Commission's guidelines, scheduled
to be published before October 1, 1976, be consulted.5 2 The
Comptroller General allowed the agreement between the United
States Dependents Schools, the European Area, and the Federation to be implemented "consistent with this decision and the
Commission's guidelines." 3 Apparently, an employee representative could spend all of his duty time on representation matters as
long as the parties agreed that it was reasonable to do so.
B. FederalPersonnelManual Letter 711-120
On October 14, 1976, the Civil Service Commission issued its
guidelines for use of official time in Federal Personnel Manual
Letter 711-120.14 Considered a landmark interpretation of sec48. Comp. Gen. Delays Official Time Ruling-4fter Meeting with Unions, Agencies, [Jan.June] GOV'T EMPL. REL. RaP. (BNA) No. 650, at A-13 (Mar. 22, 1976).
49. Id.
50. Comp. Gen's 160-Hour Limit on Offial Time Dropped in Favor of Civil Service
Commission Guidelines, [July-Dec.] Gov'r EMPL. REL RaP. (BNA) No. 675, at A-7 (Sept.

15, 1976).
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id. at A-8.
Id.
FederalPersonnelManual Letter 711-120, [July-Dec.] GoV'T EMPL. REL. REP.

(BNA) No. 676, at A-5 (Oct. 14, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Letter 711-120]. The Letter was
subsequently incorporated in the supplement to the Federal Personnel Manual. See Federal Personnel Manual Supp. 711-1, Book I, Subchapter S5, Installment 15, at 11-67.
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tion 20 of Executive Order 11,491, the Letter attempted to define
"representational functions," established a list of criteria for
agency managers to consider when authorizing a reasonable
amount of official time, and mandated that agencies institute and
maintain recordkeeping systems for official time used for representational functions.5 5 Although it was intended to clarify matters, the Letter served only to complicate the issues further due to
its bureaucratic language. Fortunately, only the recordkeeping re56
quirement remains in effect today.
The Commission's Letter first attempted to define with specificity the term "representational functions." According to the
Commission, the term meant "those activities undertaken by employees on behalf of other employees pursuant to such employees'
right to representation under statute, regulation, executive order,
or the terms of a collective bargaining agreement." 57 The Letter
went on to state that the term included "activities undertaken by
specific, individual designation [such as grievance administration]
as well as those activities authorized by a general collective
designation."5 " Despite the attempt at specificity, the definition
was laden with ambiguity. For instance, it was unclear whether
mid-term negotiations, necessitated by changed circumstances,
were included in the definition.
The Letter further stated that, when authorizing official time,
agency heads or their designees should be satisfied that the use of
official time was reasonable and mutually beneficial to the agency
and its employees. The Letter then set forth the criteria to use
when making determinations. First, usage of official time was to
be consistent with applicable statutes, regulations, and executive
orders. Second, the official time authorization had to comply with
the time restrictions of section 20. Third, the agency was required
to balance the effective conduct of the government's business
against the employees' rights of representation.5 9 Furthermore,
the agency was to consider a number of additional factors: (1) the
agency's purpose and manner of functioning, (2) the dispersion
and accessibility of the employees, (3) the number of employees
represented, (4) the supervisory structure, (5) past experience concerning efficient use of official time, and (6) the impact of em55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Letter 711-120, supra note 54, at A-6, 7.
See infra note 320 and accompanying text.
Letter 711-120, supra note 54, at A-6.
Id.
Id.
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ployee involvement in the decisionmaking process on employee
performance and efficiency as well as on the efficient administration of government. 60Although the Letter did not establish a fixed
number of hours for official time, agencies had to ensure that
amounts approved for employee representatives did not exceed
what was necessary to perform representational functions.6" The
Letter added, however, that under "no circumstances should the
amount approved result in serious interference with the assigned
responsibilities of the agency or activity or be unjustifiable in light
of the benefits, including sound employee-management relations,
to be derived."' 62 The Commission failed to define "serious interference" or "unjustifiable," which led to difficulties in
enforcement.
The Commission then reviewed past agency experience with
official time for representational functions as reflected in agency
records, negotiated agreements, and grievance and arbitration decisions. It noted that the majority of contracts already in force
authorized official time in terms of "reasonableness" rather than
specific amounts of time.63 A statistical study showed that most
federal employees engaged in representational activities spent
twenty-five percent or less of their official time in such activities,
while only a few spent more than fifty percent.' Agency experience also revealed that in determining what was a reasonable
amount of time, arbitrators tended to look at a number of factors,
including: (1) the kind and extent of matter requiring representation, (2) past practice, (3) the degree of efficiency demonstrated in
the use of official time, and (4) the cost-benefit ratio of providing
alternative means of problem resolution.6 5
Finally, the Letter required that agencies develop recordkeeping methods to account for all use of official time. Agencies were
to use this information in evaluating the impact of authorized official time on agency operations and effective employee representa60. Id. at A-6, 7.
61. Id. at A-7.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. The statistics were quoted from a 1976 survey of Union Representational Provisions in Federal Labor Agreements. The survey was conducted by the Civil Service
Commission's Office of Labor-Management Relations. USCSC/OLMR-76/11 (May 1976).
It is important to note that the Commission seemed to offer this information for comparative purposes only and not to define a standard of "reasonableness."
65. Letter 711-120, supra note 54, at A-7.
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tion.6 6 Again, the Commission left specific terms such as "impact
on agency operations" and "effective employee representation"
undefined and, thus, incapable of evaluation by any quantifiable
means.
II.

OFFICIAL TIME PROBLEMS UNDER SECTION
EXECUTIVE ORDER

11,491: QUESTIONS

20

OF

OF

CONTRACT INTERPRETATION

Under Executive Order 11,491, as amended, the use of official
time for employee representational activities was a negotiable bargaining subject that could become a contractual right if agreed to
by the parties, even though it was not a guaranteed right under the
Order.6 7 Although the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 subsequently established a statutory right to official time for representational activities,6 8 parties may still determine their official time
policy by agreement. Although the following decisions arose
under section 20 of Order 11,491, they illustrate contract interpretation problems which could affect parties which have chosen to
alter the statutory right to official time.
In Social Security Administration, the American Federation of
Government Employees, Local 1760, filed an unfair labor practice
charge alleging that the agency had violated Executive Order
11,491 by refusing to grant official time to two union officers who
had attended a meeting called by a representative of the Assistant
Secretary. 69 The purpose of the meeting was to discuss a representation petition filed by the agency in a separate proceeding.7 °
The Assistant Secretary held that the agency had no contractual
obligation to grant official time to union officials who were not
employees of the agency 71 and, therefore, dismissed the
complaint.72
Many contractual provisions governing use of official time allowed union representatives a "reasonable" amount of time to
66. Id.
67. Exec. Order No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R. 861 (1969) (1966-70 Compilation), reprintedin 5
U.S.C. § 7101 (1982) (amended version).
68. 5 U.S.C. § 7131(a) (1982); see infra note 95 and accompanying text.
69. Department of Health, Educ. and Welfare, Social Sec. Admin., Quality Assurance
Field Staff, N.E. Program Serv. Center, Flushing, N.Y., 8 A/S.L.M.R. Dec. & Rep. 508,
A/S.L.M.R. No. 1036 (1978).
70. Id. at 508.
71. Id. at 509. The union officials were employed by the Bureau of Retirement and
Survivors Insurance, a component of the Social Security Administration. Id. at 510 n.7.
72. Id. at 510.

OFFICIAL TIME

perform their representational duties.7 3 When ambiguity in the
term "reasonable" led to an abuse of the privilege or to interference with work production, employers generally were upheld in
their efforts to restrict the use of official time. 4 In a case decided
by the Federal Service Impasses Panel, for example, the employer
and the union were told to adopt language in their next collective
bargaining agreement limiting the use of official time by the union
president to fifty percent of his monthly work schedule.7 5 Rejecting the assertion that such a restriction would infringe on the
union's right to assign representatives to particular grievances, the
not constitute improper
Panel held that the fifty percent limit did
76
interference with internal union affairs.
In a similar case, an employer temporarily assigned a union
steward to a lower grade position because of the disproportionate
time he spent on union activities.77 Testimony at the unfair labor
practice hearing indicated that the steward was in a particularly
demanding position, such that his frequent absence adversely affected the employer's efficiency. 8 Moreover, the steward was
qualified for the new position and did not suffer a pay reduction
as a consequence of the transfer.7 9 Under these circumstances, the
Assistant Secretary found that the employer's action did not constitute an unfair labor practice.80
An employer, however, does not have free reign to impose restrictions on the use of official time while still negotiating with the
union over the official time policy. In WarnerRobins Air Logistics
Center, the Assistant Secretary held that an employer could not
implement its last offer of a ten percent maximum on the use of
official time if the parties had agreed to submit the issue to mediation. l Unlike the private sector, parties in the public sector can73. See supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
74. See infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
75. Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Dev. Educ. Command, Quantico, Va.,
FSIP Case No. 81, Panel Release No. 200 (Dec. 23, 1981).
76. Id.
77. Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Dep't of the Navy, Bremerton, Wash., 6
A/S.L.M.R. Dec. & Rep. 709, 712-13, A/S.L.M.R. No. 768 (1976), aft'd, 5 F.L.R.C. 324,
F.L.R.C. No. 77A-17 (1977).
78. 6 A/S.L.M.R. Dec. & Rep. No. 768 at 711-12.
79. Id. at 712.
80. Id. at 709. For a discussion of the dual role of the union representative in the
context of a discriminatory discharge case and the peculiar problems associated with the
use of official time, see Snow & Abramson, The DualRole ofthe Union Steward-A Problem
in Labor-Management Relations, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 795, 816 (1982).
81. Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, Robins Air Force Base, Ga., 7 A/S.L.M.R.
Dec. & Rep. 859, A/S.L.M.R. No. 912 (1977). The employer was ordered not to imple-
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not resort to self-help after impasse if they have an agreement to
mediate.8 2 Thus, even where an employer legitimately wants to
curb abuse of the official time policy, it must abide by the rules of
contract negotiation.
Likewise, an employer may not arbitrarily impose a maximum
limit on the use of official time without first warning individual
representatives that they have been taking an excessive amount of
official time.8 3 The imposition of a limit on the excessive use of
official time without prior warning is considered to be an unfair
labor practice. 4
In two separate cases, the Assistant Secretary held that employers may demand that an employee representative strictly adhere to established procedures for use of official time.85 Such
procedures may require that a representative obtain advance permission before taking official time.8 6 An employer may also require an employee representative to notify management personnel
whenever leaving for union activities.87 In another case, the Assistant Secretary found that the unilateral imposition of rigid restrictions on the use of official time did not constitute a patent
breach of the negotiated agreement. He implied that management's interpretation was arguably within the terms of the negotiated agreement, thus the "interpretation would merely be a matter
of contract interpretation, to be resolved through the parties'
grievance and arbitration machinery." 8
Because the use of official time under Executive Order 11,491
was a matter of contractual agreement, many cases involving contract interpretation were resolved in the arbitration forum. Most
meat policies bargained to impasse until the processes of the Federal Service Impasses
Panel had run their course. Id at 860.
82. Id. at 868.
83. Waterlivet Arsenal, United States Army Armament Command, Waterlivet, N.Y.,
6 A/S.L.M.R. Dec. & Rep. 526, A/S.L.M.R. No. 726 (1976).
84. Id. at 531-32. A two-pronged inquiry is required: (1) whether there was excessive
use of official time, and (2) whether the union representative was notified. Id.
85. United States Air Force Commissary Command, Base Commissary, Barksdale Air
Force Base, La., 8 A/S.L.M.R. Dec. & Rep. 1063, A/S.L.M.R. No. 1123 (1978); Department of the Air Force, 4392nd Aerospace Support Group, Vandenburg Air Force Base,
Cal., 7 A/S.L.M.R. Dec. & Rep. 989, A/S.L.M.R. No. 935 (1977).
86. Air Force Commissary Command, 8 A/S.L.M.R. No. 1123 at 1067; see also Environmental Protection Agency, 2 F.L.R.A. 791, F.L.R.A. No. 102 (1980) (agency may, for
valid reasons, request employee to estimate amount of work time he anticipates spending
on union activities).
87. Department of the Air Force, 7 A/S.L.M.R. No. 935 at 995.

88. Department of the Navy, Naval Air Rework Facility, Alameda, Cal., 8
A/S.L.M.R. Dec. & Rep. 814, 816, A/S.L.M.R. No. 1089 (1978).
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of these cases involved the employer imposing a limit on the use
of official time. In one such case, an employer issued a memorandum restricting the use of official time to twenty-five percent of
total worktime.89 Prior practice between the parties had allowed
the union president as much time as needed, even up to 100% of
worktime. The arbitrator found that management's denial of official time in excess of the twenty-five percent limit constituted a
violation of the collective bargaining agreement as Well as an alteration of past practice. 0 He therefore ruled that the employer
could not unilaterally impose a twenty-five percent limit on the
use of official time.91
The foregoing cases represent typical contract interpretation
problems arising under section 20 of Executive Order 11,491.
With passage of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, however,
the use of official time for representational activities became a
statutory right. The statutory embodiment brought with it new
controversies, many of which still persist. They could not be resolved merely by resorting to established rules of contract interpretation. Therefore, the law of federal labor relations under the
Civil Service Reform Act has developed through the guidance of
the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA)9 2 and the federal
circuit courts of appeals. Perhaps one of the most troublesome
controversies arising from the Act was the travel and per diem
expense question. The official time provisions did not address
union reimbursement for such costs, generating the type of confusion that often accompanies legislative silence. A partial answer
89. Tooele Army Depot v. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
Lodgo No. 2261 (unpublished 1978) (St. Clair, Arb.).
90. Id. at 16.
91. Id. at 18; see also Bremerton Metal Trades Council v. Naval Undersea Warfare
Eng'g Station (unpublished 1980) (Rudolph, Arb.) ("reasonable time" provision restricted
to 10 hours per week constituted breach of collective bargaining agreement); Naval Ordnance Station v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Lodge No. 830
(unpublished 1979) (Render, Arb.) (management's imposition of limitation of 20% per
week upon union president's use of official time violated collective bargaining agreement).
But c. Department of the Navy, Naval Weapons Station, Concord, Cal., 8 A/S.L.M.R.
Dec. & Rep. 996, A/S.L.M.R. No. 1115 (1978) (management's assessment that annual
leave time should not exceed 25% of duty time found to be reasonable interpretation of
contract provision; Assistant Secretary emphasized that decision based on contract interpretation rather than breach with past practice).
92. In enacting the Civil Service Reform Act, Congress established the Federal Labor
Relations Authority (FLRA) to assume the duties of the FLRC. Unlike its predecessor, the
FLRA was deliberately set up as an autonomous body. No more than two of the Authority's three members may be affiliated with the same political party, and none may hold
another position in the federal government except as otherwise provided-by law. See 5
U.S.C. § 7104 (1982).
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to this difficult question recently came from the United States
Supreme Court in Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v.
FLRA .9 To understand the complexity of the travel and per
diem expense issue as well as other questions that now cloud the
concept of official time, it will be helpful to examine the Civil
Service Reform Act and its interpretation by the FLRA before
focusing on the sharp split among the circuit courts of appeals, the
arguments the Supreme Court analyzed in Bureau ofAlcohol, and
subsequent reaction to the Court's decision.
III.

THE SCOPE OF OFFICIAL TIME UNDER THE CIVIL SERVICE
REFORM ACT OF 1978: THE TRAVEL AND PER DIEM
EXPENSE CONTROVERSY

A.

Roots of the Controversy

1. Section 7131
On October 13, 1978, President Carter signed the Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978 into law.94 Title VII of the Act establishes the
basic framework for labor-management relations in the federal
sector, supplanting the battery of executive orders, Comptroller
General opinions, and contractual interpretations which formerly
controlled this area. One of the Act's most significant innovations
is its concept of official time. Under section 7131, employee representatives are guaranteed 100% official or "duty" time whenever
they are needed for collective bargaining negotiations.9 5 While
section 7131 answers the fundamental question of whether union
representatives are entitled to official time, it simultaneously raises
many new questions.
As an initial matter, the strict prohibition against official time
except by contractual agreement contained in the original version
93. 104 S. Ct. 439 (1983).
94. Pub. L, No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.
(1982)). See generally Coleman,supra note 16 (advocating further reform in federal labormanagement relations); Cooper & Bauer, FederalSector Labor Relations Reform, 56 CHI.KENT L. REv. 509 (1980) (discussing Title VII of the Act in historical context of United
States labor reform); Frazier, Labor-ManagementRelations in the FederalGovernment, 30
LAB. L.J. 131 (1979) (discussing implementation of the Act).
95. Section 7131(a) provides:
Any employee representing an exclusive representative in the negotiation of a
collective bargaining agreement under this chapter shall be authorized official
time for such purposes, including attendance at impasse proceeding, during the
time the employee otherwise would be in a duty status. The number of employees
for whom official time is authorized under this subsection shall not exceed the
number of individuals designated as representing the agency for such purposes.

5 U.S.C. § 7131(a) (1982).
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of Executive Order 11,491 contrasts sharply with the allowance of

100% of official time in section 7131(a).9 6 The only restriction is
that the number of union negotiators receiving official time cannot
exceed the number of management negotiators. 97 Section 713 1(b)
continues the prohibition against using official time for internal
union business, 98 while subsection (c) authorizes the FLRA to determine whether employees participating in FLRA proceedings
should receive official time.99 The final subsection provides that

parties may bargain for a "reasonable" amount of official time to
cover those representational activities not addressed in the preced-

ing subsections."°
Not long after the statute's enactment, questions arose concerning the intended scope of section 7131(a). Specifically, the
newly created FLRA' 0° had to determine whether section 7131(a)
covered mid-term contract negotiations and whether it also allowed reimbursement to union representatives for their travel and

per diem expenses. Pursuant to its authority under section
7105(a)(1) of the Act,"0 2 the FLRA solicited public comment from
interested persons. On December 19, 1979, the FLRA issued its
96. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 95.
98. Section 713 1(b) provides: "Any activities performed by any employee relating to
the internal business of a labor organization (including the solicitation of membership,
elections of labor organization officials, and collection of dues) shall be performed during
the time the employee is in a nonduty status." 5 U.S.C. § 7131(b) (1982).
99. Section 7131(c) provides:
Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section, the Authority shall determine
whether any employee participating for, or on behalf of, a labor organization in
any phase of proceedings before the Authority shall be authorized official time for
such purpose during the time the employee otherwise would be in a duty status.
5 U.S.C. § 7131(c) (1982).
100. Section 7131(d) provides:
Except as provided in the preceding subsections of this section(1) Any employee representing an exclusive representative, or
(2) in connection with any other matter covered by this chapter, any employee in an appropriate unit represented by an exclusive representative,
shall be granted official time in any amount the agency and the exclusive
representative involved agree to be reasonable, necessary, and in the public
interest.
5 U.S.C. § 7131(d) (1982).
101. See supra note 92. Many observers see the FLRA as a great improvement over its
management-oriented predecessor. See, e.g., Frazier, supra note 94, at 133-34.
102. Section 7105(a)(1) provides: "The Authority shall provide leadership in establishing policies and guidance relating to. matters under this chapter, and, except as otherwise
provided, shall be responsible for carrying out the purpose of this chapter." 5 U.S.C.
§ 7105(a)(1) (1982). The FLRA also has authority to promulgate rules and regulations as
necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act. 5 U.S.C. § 7134 (1982). In analyzing this
dichotomy, the Ninth Circuit determined that the InterpretationandGuidance was issued as
an interpretative policy guideline under § 7105 rather than under the rulemaking authority
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Interpretationand Guidance, °3 addressing these two basic questions concerning section 7131(a) and also determining the effect of
the savings clause of section 7135(a)(1) °" on existing collective

bargaining agreements.
2.

The FLR,4 -s Interpretation and Guidance

Relying on legislative history and the implicit congressional
intent underlying Title VII of the Act, the FLRA concluded: (1)

that section 7131(a) encompasses all negotiations between an exclusive representative and an agency, regardless of whether the
negotiations occur during the term of the contract; 0 5 (2) that employee representatives on official time are entitled to payment
from their agencies for travel and per diem expenses;"° and (3)

that provisions in existing collective bargaining agreements which
are more restrictive than the official time policy of section 7131
may be renewed if both parties agree, or may be superseded by

section 7135(a)(1) if either party objects to continuation of the
contractual provision.' 07
In concluding that section 713 1(a) applied to mid-term negotiations, the FLRA looked first at explicit language in the statute
which provides that an employee representative must be given ofof § 7134. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA, 672 F.2d 732, 735 (9th Cir.
1982); see infra text accompanying note 155.
103. 2 F.L.R.A. 264, F.L.R.A. No. 31 (1979).
104. Section 7135(a)(1) provides:
(a) Nothing contained in this chapter shall preclude(I) the renewal or continuation of an exclusive recognition, certification of an
exclusive representative, or a lawful agreement between an agency and an
exclusive representative of its employees, which is entered into before the effective date of this chapter.
5 U.S.C. § 7135(a)(1) (1982).
105. 2 F.L.R.A. No. 31 at 267 (1979).
106. Id.
107. Id. To an arbitrator whose primary duty is to interpret contract language so that
parties to a negotiated collective bargaining agreement may carry out their mutually intended duties and obligations, this third conclusion may be the most dramatic. If a party
objects to the retention of a more restrictive contract provision, § 713 1(a) operates to authorize official time as well as travel and per diem expenses. Thus, a union which might
otherwise be content to continue the official time policy negotiated under Executive Order
11,491 might unilaterally invoke the more liberal policy of § 7131 to its advantage. Moreover, the official time will be authorized for all negotiations, in accordance with the
FLRA's first conclusion regarding mid-term negotiations. These benefits are consistent
with the congressional desire to expedite implementation of the more liberal official time
provisions of the Act.
To the extent that parties retain contractual provisions governing official time, these
provisions are subject to traditional rules of contract interpretation in the event of a dispute. See supra notes 67-91 and accompanying text.
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ficial time when representing a union in negotiating a "collective
bargaining agreement." ' 8
Relying on statutory definitions, 09 the FLRA concluded that
"collective bargaining agreement" means any agreement entered
into as a result of the parties' good faith bargaining about employment conditions." 0 Thus, it determined that Congress must have
intended the official time provision to apply to all contract negotiations, even those occurring in mid-contract."'
To buttress its conclusion, the FLRA found support in the legislative history of section 7131(a). The Authority noted that Congress rejected language proposed in the Senate's version of the
section" 2 that would have continued the restrictive official time
policy of section 20 of Executive Order 11,491.1 13 Moreover, Congress rejected a Senate Committee suggestion that official time be
limited to negotiation of a basic collective bargaining agreement,
prohibiting official time for "negotiations which arise out of circumstances during the term of the basic agreement."'' 4 To the
contrary, Congress adopted language indentical to that in the
House version of section 7131(a) which did not indicate an intent
to limit the use of official time to the negotiation of basic collective
bargaining agremeents."15 By rejecting the Senate Committee Report and proposed language in the Senate Bill, the FLRA reato remove previous
soned that Congress must have intended
6
restrictions on the use of official time."
108. 2 F.L.R.A. No. 31 at 265-68.
109. Section 7103(a)(8) defines "collective bargaining agreement" as follows:
"[C]ollective bargaining agreement means an agreement entered into as a result of collective bargaining pursuant to the provisions of this chapter." 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(8) (1982).
Section 7103(a)(12) defines "collective bargaining" as follows:
"[C]ollective bargaining" means the performance of the mutual obligation of the
representative of an agency and the exclusive representative of employees in an
appropriate unit in the agency to meet at reasonable times and to consult and
bargain in a good-faith effort to reach agreement with respect to the conditions of
employment affecting such employees and to execute, if requested by either party,
a written document incorporating any collective bargaining agreement reached,
but the obligation referred to in this paragraph does not compel either party to
agree to a proposal or to make a concession.
5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(12) (1982).
110. 2 F.L.R.A. No. 31 at 267.
111. Id.
112. S. 2640, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 7232 (1978).
113. 2 F.L.R.A. No. 31 at 267. Section 7232 of Senate Bill 2640 was identical to the
language of § 20 of Executive Order 11,491 as amended. See supra note 26.
114. S. REP. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 112, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODEC6NG. &
AD. NEWS 2723, 2834.
115. 2 F.L.R.A. No. 31 at 267; see H.R. 11280, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 7132(a) (1978).
116. 2 F.L.R.A. No. 31 at 267-68.
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Using a broad public policy analysis, the FLRA concluded by
noting Congress' recognition in section 7131 (a) that "labor organizations and collective bargaining in the civil service are in the
public interest."' 1 7 Therefore, the Authority found that a liberal

interpretation of section 7131(a), allowing official time for midterm negotiations, was necessary to achieve the legislatively declared goal of effective union representation. 1 8 As the FLRA interpreted it, effective union representation could be realized only
by equalizing the position of union negotiators with that traditionally held by government negotiators." 9 This equalization argument became the cornerstone of the FLRA's analytical framework
justifying its decision to allow employee representatives to recoup
travel and per diem expenses.
The most controversial aspect of the Interpretation,the travel

and per diem expense ruling, found support in three separate arguments. Intially, the FLRA considered the statutory language
and legislative history. Conceding that neither expressly allowed
payment of travel and per diem expenses, 2 0 the FLRA noted that
Congress, nevertheless, believed that "collective bargaining 'contributes to the effective conduct of public business' and that 'collective bargaining in the civil service [is] in the public
interest.' "21 Hence, the FLRA concluded that union representatives engaged in negotiating a collective bargaining agreement
were "clearly engaged in 'official business' for the Government"
and, therefore, were entitled to per diem and travel expenses
under 5 U.S.C. § 5702(a). 12 2
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. The FLRA further noted that under § 7114(b) of the Act, parties had an obligation "to meet at reasonable times ... as frequently as may be necessary" for good-faith
negotiations. Id. at 268; see 5 U.S.C. § 7114(b)(3) (1982). To fulfill this obligation, parties
would have to be given official time for all negotiations relating to employment conditions,
not just negotiations for a basic agreement. 2 F.L.R.A. No. 31 at 268.
120. 2 F.L.R.A. No. 31 at 269. While conceding the lack of direct support in the legislative history, the FLRA argued in a footnote that under Executive Order 11,491 it was
clear that travel expenditures were not authorized for union representatives engaged in
negotiation activities. By expressly rejecting the Senate Bill which would have retained the
language of § 20 as well as its recognized interpretation, Congress must have intended to
change the policy toward travel and per diem expenses implicitly while changing official
time policy expressly. 2 F.L.R.A. No. 31 at 269 n.6.
121. Id. at 269 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (1982)).
122. Section 5702(a) provides in pertinent part: "Under regulations prescribed under
section 5707 of this title, an employee while traveling on official business away from his
designated post of duty.., is entitled to. .. a per diem allowance." 5 U.S.C. § 5702(a)
(1982).
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Positing an equalization theory, the FLRA next argued that
because management negotiators were uniformly compensated for
their travel and per diem expenses, union negotiators were entitled to the same benefit.' 2 3 As evidence of a congressional intent
to equalize union and management bargaining positions, the
FLRA quoted from Representative Clay's discussion of the House
version of section 7131(b): "'[Labor] organizations should be allowed official time to carry out their statutory representational activities just as management uses official time to carry out its
responsibilities.' "124 According to the Authority, payment of per
diem and travel expenses "would not only more nearly equate the
status of union and management negotiators. . . but also would
facilitate more effective union representation," accomplishing the
stated purpose of the statute.1 25 As a postscript, the FLRA noted
that it had previously interpreted the concept of official time in
section 713 1(c) to include an authorization for travel and per diem
expenses; 126 it could find no persuasive reason for interpretating
127
the analogous language of section 7131(a) differently.
For these reasons, the FLRA concluded that union negotiators
were entitled to travel and per diem expenses.1 28 This deceptively
simple conclusion has had an enormous impact on labor-management relations in the federal sector. Prior to 1978, union negotiators received as much as fifty percent of official time and, then,
only if it had been provided for in the collective bargaining agreement.'2 9 Further, a series of Comptroller General opinions in
1965 and 1966 emphasized that even if official time were authorized, union representatives generally were not entitled to travel
and per diem expenses because collective bargaining benefited
only the union and not the federal government. 130 With passage
123. 2 F.L.R.A. No. 31 at 270.
124. Id. (emphasis added by FLRA).
125. Id.
126. Id. The Supreme Court dismissed as insignificant the fact that the FLRA construed two similar provisions of the Act consistently. Bureauof Alcohol, 104 S. Ct. at 445
n.9.

127. 2 F.L.R.A. No. 31 at 270.
128. Id.
129. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
130. See 44 Comp. Gen. 617 (1965); 45 Comp. Gen. 454 (1966). Later in 1966, the
Comptroller General retreated somewhat from his position, adopting Civil Service Commission guidelines regarding travel and per diem expense reimbursement for employee
representatives. See 46 Comp. Gen. 21 (1966). Under these guidelines, representatives
were generally not entitled to reimbursement for attending negotiations, but could receive
reimbursement if the agency head certified that the representative's travel was primarily in
the government's interest. Id. at 21-22.
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of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 and issuance of the
FLRA's Interpretation in 1979, union negotiators had a right not
only to 100% of official time regardless of the contract, but also to
reimbursement for their travel and per diem expenses. As a result,
the balance of power in federal labor negotiations was dramatically adjusted.
In a recent study on negotiability in the federal sector, one
writer specifically noted two significant aspects of the FLRA's Interpretation in assessing the impact it has had on agency management and federal employee unions. 3 ' First, while private sector
unions frequently reimburse their negotiators for lost pay and expenses, this is not economically feasible in the federal sector because the predominant voluntary union membership system does
not generate sufficient dues income. "From this perspective, the
authority's decision may be viewed as constituting implicit recognition that the trade-off for voluntary unionism is the requirement
that an agency share an increased proportion of the union's collective bargaining expenses." 13' 2
Second, under Executive Order 11,491, agencies and unions
often conducted negotiations in Washington, D.C., necessitating
considerable transportation expense for unions. The resulting
financial pressure on unions allowed agencies to employ tactics
designed to subvert the negotiation process, eventually encouraging union negotiators to yield to agency demands. 33 The fact that
the Interpretation required agencies to pay 100% of official time as
well as travel and per diem expenses both to management and
union negotiators, theoretically provided a greater incentive to
reach a quick settlement.' 34 Moreover, for agency-wide unions
with members scattered over an entire region or the entire country, the FLRA ruling allowed their limited financial resources to
be used for activities such as grievance investigation and arbitration. Without federal reimbursement for travel expenses, these
unions were forced to exhaust their resources to pay the transpor35
tation costs of negotiation.1
From a management perspective, the economic impact of the
FLRA's Interpretation was virtually incalculable. It certainly increased negotiation costs, which ultimately were borne by the tax131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

H. ROBINSON, NEGOTIABILITY IN THE FEDERAL SECTOR (1981).
Id. at 173-74.
Id. at 174.
Id.
Id.
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paying public. One Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
official observed in 1980 that preliminary cost estimates from only
fifteen federal agencies indicated that the cost for union travel and
136
per diem expenses would be in excess of $2,000,000 per year.
The bill for union expenses in negotiating the 1980 contract for
75,000 Social Security Administration employees totaled
$1,100,000.137

Given the enormous advantage realized by federal employee
unions and the huge cost to be absorbed by federal agencies, it is
no wonder that OPM vigorously protested the FLRA ruling.
However, rather than appealing through administrative channels
as required by the Act, 138 OPM asked federal agencies to challenge the ruling on a case-by-case basis by refusing to honor requests for official time and travel and per diem expenses. 139 This
approach forced unions to sue noncomplying agencies to obtain
reimbursement for expenses.
In every unfair labor practice charge brought against an
agency for failure to pay travel and per diem expenses under section 713 1(a), the FLRA found merit in the charge and ordered the
agency to pay. 140 However, the FLRA's Interpretation was not as
136. National Treasury Employees Union Seeks Travel, Per Diemfor Representation
Functions, [Jan.-June] GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 852, at 11 (March 10, 1980)
(speech given by Anthony Ingrassia, Assistant Director for Labor-Management Relations
of the OPM, to Defense Department labor relations conference).
137. Budget CutsJustify SettingAside FLR4 s TravelPay Rule, Society ofFederalLabor
RelationsProfessionalsIs Told, [Jan.-June] Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 957, at 10,
13 (Apr. 5, 1982) (remarks of American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1923,

union officers).
138. Section 7123 provides the procedure for judicial review under the Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978. See 5 U.S.C. § 7123 (1982).
139. See United States Dep't of Agriculture v. FLRA, 691 F.2d 1242, 1251 (8th Cir.
1982) (Heaney, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 523 (1983).
140. United States Customs Serv., 7 F.L.R.A. 464, F.L.R.A. No. 70 (1981), rev'd, No.
82-1195 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 29, 1984) (appellant's motion for summary dismissal granted); Division of Military & Naval Affairs, 7 F.L.R.A. 458, F.L.RtA. No. 69 (1981),rev'd, 683 F.2d
45 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 523 (1983); Bureau of the Mint, 7 F.L.R.A. 453,
F.L.R.A. No. 68 (1981), rev'd, No. 82-1194 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 29, 1984) (appellant's motion
for summary dismissal granted); United States Dep't of Agriculture, 6 F.L.R.A. 265,
F.L.R.A. No. 45 (1981), rev'd, 691 F.2d 1242 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 523
(1983); Florida Nat'l Guard, 5 F.L.R.A. 365, F.L.R.A. No. 49 (1981), rev'd, 699 F.2d 1082
(11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 524 (1983); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 4 F.L.R.A. 288, F.L.R.A. No. 40 (1980), enforced, 672 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd,
104 S. Ct. 439 (1983); see also United States Dep't of Justice, 12 F.L.R.A. 9, F.L.R.A. No. 4
(1983); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 10 F.L.R.A. 277, F.L.R.A. No. 52 (1982);
Department of Treasury, IRS, 10 F.L.R.A. 263, F.L.R.A. No. 50 (1982); United States
Customs Serv., 10 F.L.R.A. 231, F.L.R.A. No. 44 (1982); Department of Treasury, IRS, 10
F.L.R.A. 210, F.L.R.A. No. 42 (1982); Department of Treasury, IRS, 10 F.L.R.A. 194,
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successful in the federal courts. Of the four circuit courts addressing the issue, only one upheld the FLRA's decision. On November 29, 1983, the Supreme Court resolved the circuit conflict by
holding that the FLRA lacked the power to require that federal

agencies reimburse union negotiators for their travel and per diem
expenses.

41

The Courtdeclared the FLRA's construction of sec-

tion 713 1(a) in its Interpretationunenforceable since such a policy

decision is "properly made by Congress."' 42 However, the Court
did more than merely dispose of the question regarding the deference owed an agency such as the FLRA-it examined the history
of official time, more specifically the history of travel and per

diem expenses, before deciding that they are not contemplated by
section 7131.
A look at the varying positions adopted by the circuit courts of
appeals addressing the travel and per diem issue prior to Bureau of
Alcohol illustrates the complexity inherent in the controversy.
Since the statute and legislative history were silent regarding
travel and per diem expenses, the problem facing the reviewing
courts was a familiar one: how to divine congressional intent.
Prior to Bureau ofAlcohol, only the Ninth Circuit permitted reimbursement; but of the other three circuits addressing the issue
only one ruled unanimously against it.
B.

Split Among the Circuits: Choosing Sides

1. The Bureau of Alcohol Case
The Bureau of Alcohol'4 3 case began as one of the first challenges to the FLRA's Interpretation. In early 1980, the National
F.L.R.A. No. 38 (1982); Environmental Protection Agency, 10 F.L.R.A. 151, F.L.R.A. No.
30 (1982); Department of Treasury, IRS, 10 F.L.R.A. 84, F.L.R.A. No. 21 (1982); United
States Customs Serv., 9 F.L.R.A. 779, F.L.R.A. No. 98 (1982); Department of Defense
Dependents Schools, 9 F.L.R.A. 769, F.L.R.A. No. 96 (1982); Department of Treasury,
IRS, 9 F.L.R.A. 637, F.L.R.A. No. 72 (1982); Bureau of the Public Debt, 9 F.L.R.A. 514,
F.L.R.A. No. 59 (1982); Department of Treasury, IRS, 9 F.L.R.A. 333, F.L.R.A. No. 40
(1982); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Headquarters, 9 F.L.R.A. 246,
F.L.R.A. No. 34 (1982); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 9 F.L.R.A. 188, F.L.R.A.
No. 29 (1982); Department of Treasury, IRS, 8 F.L.R.A. 578, F.L.R.A. No. 110 (1982).
For cases involving a refusal to grant official time on a mid-term negotiations issue, see
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 10 F.L.R.A. 147, F.L.R.A. No. 29 (1982); Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 9 F.L.R.A. 529, F.L.R.A. No. 62 (1982); Department of
Treasury, IRS, 9 F.L.R.A. 362, F.L.R.A. No. 42 (1982); Department of Treasury, IRS, 8
F.L.R.A. 773, F.L.R.A. No. 129 (1982).
141. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA, 104 S. Ct. 439 (1983).
142. Id. at 450 (quoting American Ship Bldg. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965)).
143. 4 F.L.R.A. 288, F.L.R.A. No. 40 (1980), enforced, 672 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1982),
rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 439 (1983).
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Treasury Employees Union requested a meeting with Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms officials to negotiate the proposed
relocation of an agency office. The existing collective bargaining
agreement between the parties provided for quarterly meetings for
which union representatives were granted official time.1" The
agency refused to classify the requested relocation meeting as one
covered by the collective bargaining agreement and, therefore, refused the union's request" for official time. 4 5 Subsequently, the

union filed an unfair labor practice charge seeking official time as
well as travel and per diem expenses for the meeting.

46

Relying

on the recently issued Interpretation,the administrative law judge
determined that the agency violated section 7116(a)(1) and

(a)(8) t47 of the Act by refusing to grant official time and expenses.' 4 8 The FLRA affirmed the findings of the
administrative
14 9
law judge and ordered payment by the agency.
The agency sought review15 0 of the FLRA's decision and the

FLRA cross-petitioned for enforcement of its order requiring the
agency to pay official time and expenses.' 5' Under section 7123 of
the Act,' review of an FLRA decision must be on the record and

the decision may be set aside only if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law."'' 53 The Ninth
Circuit noted at the outset, however, that the validity of the
144. 672 F.2d at 734.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 734-35.
147. Section 7116 of the Act sets forth the kinds of misconduct which constitute an
unfair labor practice. Failure to pay official time and travel and per diem expenses has
been held by the FLRA to violate § 7116(a)(1) and (a)(8). See infra text accompanying
notes 275-77. These subsections provide:
(a) For the purpose of this chapter, it shall be an unfair labor practice for an
agency(I) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce any employee in the exercise by the
employee of any right under this chapter,
(8) to otherwise fail or refuse to comply with any provision of this chapter.
5 U.S.C. § 7116(a)(1), (8) (1982).
148. 672 F.2d at 735.
149. Id.; see 4 F.L.R.A. 288, F.L.R.A. No. 40 (1980).
150. As with decisions of the National Labor Relations Board in the private sector, the
federal courts of appeals have appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the FLRA. 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(f) (1976) (NLRB review); 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a) (1982) (FLRA review).
151. 672 F.2d at 735.
152. Section 7123(c) provides that the standard of review upon appeal of an FLRA
decision shall be reflected in the record in accordance with § 706 of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
153. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
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FLRA's decision depended on the validity of the Interpretation. 5
Thus, the court focused on it exclusively.
One of the pivotal issues in each of the appeals involving official time was the degree of deference to be accorded the Interpretation. The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by noting that while
section 7134 of the Act grants authority for the FLRA to promulgate rules and regulations, the Interpretation was issued pursuant
to section 7105(a)(1) which allows the FLRA to provide policy
guidelines for the interpretation and implementation of Title VII
of the Act.' "As an interpretative rule, therefore, it may be accorded less weight than rules issued pursuant to the delegated
rulemaking authority of Congress."'' 5 6 The court, nevertheless,
determined that the Interpretationwould be upheld if it was "reasoned and supportable."' 5 7 This conclusion is a significant factor
which distinguishes the Ninth Circuit's decision from those of the
Second, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits.'
Once the Ninth Circuit
determined the proper standard of review, its conclusion that the
Interpretation comported with the standard was virtually
inevitable.
Although the central issue confronting the Supreme Court in
Bureau of Alcohol was the travel and per diem expense question,
the lower court case also involved a challenge of the FLRA's conclusion that mid-term negotiations are included in the statutory
authorization for official time under section 713 l(a). 59 The Ninth
Circuit followed the FLRA's analysis in the Interpretation, concluding that Congress intended to include mid-term negotiations
within its authorization of official time. Looking to the statutory
language of Title VII, the court noted the statutory definition of
"collective bargaining" and the obligation of the parties to "meet
as frequently as may be necessary"' 6 0 to fulfill their statutory duty
to negotiate in good faith.' 6 ' The court found that "collective bar154. 672 F.2d at 735.
155. Id.
156. Id. (citing General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976)).
157. 672 F.2d at 735. The court stated that "[i]f an agency's construction of a statute is
reasonably defensible, it should not be rejected simply because a court might prefer another view." Id. The Ninth Circuit relied on this standard to find the FLRA's Interpretation "reasonably defensible," even though the agency's arguments had some merit.
158. Division of Military & Naval Affairs v. FLRA, 683 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1982); United
States Dept. of Agriculture v. FLRA, 691 F.2d 1242 (8th Cir. 1982); Florida Nat'l Guard v.
FLRA, 699 F.2d 1082 (11th Cir. 1982).
159. Bureau of Alcohol, 672 F.2d at 736.

160. See supra note 109.
161.

672 F.2d at 736.
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gaining" was defined by Congress to include all situations in
which parties meet "with the objective of conducting good faith
negotiations concerning conditions of employment."1 62 Given the
maxim of statutory construction that whenever the same phrase is
used in different parts of a statute it is presumed to be used in the
same sense throughout, the court concluded that Congress did not
intend the authorization of official
time to be limited only to the
1 63
negotiation of basic agreements.
Focusing next on the legislative history of Title VII, the court
concluded that official time for mid-term negotiations was permissible. It accordingly dismissed the agency's contention that section 7131 (a)'s silence regarding mid-term negotiations meant that
Congress intended to preserve earlier restrictions.164 Rather, the
Ninth Circuit stated that had Congress wanted to restrict the use
of official time for mid-term negotiations, it would have done so in
precise language. Moreover, the court agreed with the FLRA that
an authorization of official time for all negotiations is consistent
with the congressional finding that collective bargaining is in the
65
public interest.1
Having laid the foundation for the interpretation of congressional intent, the court addressed the travel and per diem expense
issue. Once again, the court followed arguments set forth by the
FLRA in its Interpretation. Noting the similarity of the language
in section 713 1(a) and (c) of the Act, the court found it reasonable
to conclude that both subsections should be given the same construction with respect to the availability of travel and per diem

expenses. 166
The court found that collective bargaining "in the federal service is in the public interest."' 167 Hence, the FLRA correctly concluded that union negotiators on official time were similar to other
government employees conducting business for the government
and, therefore, were entitled to reimbursement under 5 U.S.C.

§ 5702.168
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit noted that Congress' finding that
collective bargaining is in the public interest supports the FLRA's
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 737.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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effort to equalize the bargaining status of the negotiating parties
and that reimbursement undoubtedly lessens management's
financial advantage. The court also rejected the notion that the
Interpretation would impair the willingness of union negotiators
to bargain, noting that it "yields no more advantage to labor negotiators than that formerly possessed by management negotiators."' 169 The court concluded that "the FLRA, acting in its own

area of expertise, has interpreted the relevant language of Title
VII in a clearly defensible manner, and we are neither permitted
nor inclined to substitute a different judgment." 70
2. The Approach of the Second, Eighth, andEleventh Circuits

A key difference between the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Bureau
ofAlcohol and the opinions of the Second, Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuits is the degree of deference given the FLRA's Interpretation.17 The Ninth Circuit viewed the FLRA's discussion of "official business" under 5 U.S.C. § 5702 as merely incidental to its
analysis of the intended scope of section 7131(a). 172 The Second, 173 Eighth, 174 and Eleventh 175 Circuits, on the other hand,

found that the FLRA was clearly beyond its area of expertise in
equating "collective bargaining in the public interest" with "official business for the government." Further, they noted that an
agency owes no great deference to another agency's interpretation
of a statute.176 Thus, these circuits accorded a lesser degree of
deference to the FLRA's decision than that given by the Ninth
Circuit, at least with respect to the FLRA's conclusion that union
negotiators77involved in contract negotiation were on "official
business." 1

Having established that the FLRA Interpretation deserved
neither blind acceptance nor outright rejection, each court pro169. Id. at 738.
170. Id.
171. See infra notes 176-94 and accompanying text.
172. Bureau ofAlcohol, 672 F.2d at 737-38.
173. Division of Military & Naval Affairs v. FLRA, 683 F.2d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1982).
174. United States Dep't of Agriculture v. FLRA, 691 F.2d 1242, 1247 (8th Cir. 1982).
175. Florida Nat'l Guard v. FLRA, 699 F.2d 1082, 1085 (1lth Cir. 1982).
176. Division of Military& NavalAffairs, 683 F.2d at 48; Department ofAgriculture, 691
F.2d at 1246-47; FloridaNat'l Guard, 699 F.2d at 1085.
177. The Eleventh Circuit stated that the FLRA's decision should be accorded only the
"deference and respect that its internal logic and thoroughness warrant." FloridaNat'l
Guard, 699 F.2d at 1085. The court further noted that even if the Ninth Circuit were
correct in applying a "reasoned and supportable" standard, the FLRA's Interpretationstill
would not pass muster. Id. at 1085 n.8.
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ceeded to attack the FLRA's construction of congressional intent
and statutory language. The Second Circuit in Division ofMilitary
& NavalAffairs stated that the FLRA could not cite any legislative history to support its conclusion that collective bargaining on
official time is also "official business."' l7 8 Further, the FLRA's reliance on the congressional finding that collective bargaining is in
the public interest was, in the court's view, unfounded. 17 9 A judicious reading of the legislative history would have indicated that
Congress found the "statutoryprotection of collective bargaining
furthers the public interest."'' 18 Thus, the Second Circuit remained unpersuaded by the FLRA's theory.
The court concluded by comparing the FLRA's ruling to experience in the private sector under NLRB decisions. It noted that
payment of union negotiators' travel and per diem expenses is an
extraordinary remedy which the NLRB uses only when an employer fails to bargain in good faith.18 1 Given the underlying rationale that one universal purpose of collecting union dues is to
finance activities such as contract neogotiation, and given the absence of a mandate to that effect, the Second Circuit could find no
imposing such an "unusual burden" on the
justification for
82
government.
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit in Department of Agriculture
challenged the FLRA's "official business" argument by noting
that the Interpretationignores the crucial difference between "the
interest of the public at large and the interest of the Government
as employer."' 83 The Eighth Circuit maintained that the two
terms are quite different. While furthering the public interest by
their involvement in the collective bargaining process, union
negotiators were not necessarily furthering the interest of the government.' 84 The court suggested that, carried to its extreme, the
FLRA's argument would mean that labor organizations should be
funded by the government because they also were in the "public
178. 683 F.2d at 48.
179. Id.
180. Id. (emphasis in original). The court correctly noted that Congress did not grant a
blanket endorsement to collective bargaining, but rather mirrored the endorsement found
in Executive Order 11,491.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 49.
183. 691 F.2d at 1248. The distinction is between "interest of the public" as delineated
in § 7101 and "official business for government" as set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 5702. Id. at n. 11.
184. Id. at 1248.
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interest."' 8 5 Moreover, the court determined that Congress did
offinot explicitly reject Executive Order 11,491's limitations on
86
cial time, thus suggesting an acceptance of prior practice.'
The Eighth Circuit also rejected the FLRA's equalization theory. While an argument exists that Congress intended to equalize
the positions of labor and management with respect to official
time, the court found no such intent regarding per diem and travel
expenses.' 8 7 It further dismissed any contention that refusing to
allow unions reimbursement for expenses would lead to management abuse of the collective bargaining process since both parties
are statutorily bound to bargain in good faith. The court highlighted that the Act itself creates inequities between labor and
management. 8 8 Finally, the court curtly rejected the FLRA's argument based on section 713 1(c) by noting that no court ever had
approved the Authority's construction of that subsection. Consequently, the court deemed any attempt to analogize 7131 (c) to section 713 1(a) inappropriate. 18 9
The Second and Eighth Circuit rejections of the FLRA's arguments were echoed by the Eleventh Circuit in FloridaNational
Guard. It reasoned that neither a finding that collective bargaining is in the public interest nor an intent to equalize the bargaining status of labor and management sufficiently supports the
proposition that Congress intended the government to assume the
full financial burden of negotiation.' 9 0 The Eleventh Circuit further argued that congressional silence indicated acceptance of past
practice since the legislature presumptively knows the existing executive and judicial viewpoints.' 9' To explain any apparent inequity in allowing official time while denying expenses, the court
reiterated the Eighth Circuit's argument that union dues are collected for the purpose of financing negotiation. Thus, governfinancial burden would
mental financing of the union's entire
' 92
result "in inequality-not equality."'
Underlying each of these opinions was a deep-seated eco185. Id. at n.12.
186. Id. at 1248-49.
187. Id. at 1249-50.
188. Id. at 1250.
189. Id. at n.18.
190. 699 F.2d at 1087.
191. Id.
192. Id.; see also id. at 1087-88 n. II("If the Authority's position prevailed, the Federal
Government would be the only federally regulated employer required to pay the travel and
per diem expenses incurred by union negotiators.").

OFFICIAL TIME

nomic .concern. The courts suggested that a broad policy statement indicating collective bargaining was in the public interest
was "too thin a reed" to support a ruling which would require a
federal expenditure of millions of dollars.19 The Eighth Circuit
summarized this consideration when it declared:
The FLRA's Interpretation assumes that Congress authorized
additional expenditures to cover travel expenses and per diem
without making even an oblique reference to that effect. Because we are unwilling to impose additional financial liability
on the Government without an affirmative directive from Congress, we prefer the interpretation that
194 does not make the Government liable for these expenses.
To all three courts, the price tag on the FLRA's ruling was simply
unaffordable in an era of congressional budget slashing. The
courts, therefore, were unwilling to interpret between the lines to
find a congresssional intent supporting such a potentially enormous expenditure. This argument perhaps proved to be far more
persuasive than any of the legal arguments offered for or against
the Interpretation.
While the Eleventh Circuit's opinion was unanimous, there
were strong dissents in each of the other two cases. In Division of
Military & Naval Affairs, Judge Oakes argued that the majority
mischaracterized the FLRA's Interpretationwhen it suggested that
the FLRA improperly construed a statute outside its area of
expertise. 95 Further, the dissent noted that the FLRA's construction of "official business" under section 5702(a) was only in96
cidental to its primary decision regarding section 7131(a).1
Consequently, Judge Oakes found that the FLRA's decision was
"reasonably defensible" and should have been upheld. 197
193. Division ofMilitary& NavalAffairs, 683 F.2d at 48 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing Pennhurst
State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19 (1980)).
194. Department of Agriculture, 691 F.2d at 1247.
195. The dissent pointed out that the General Services Administration, not the FLRA,
should construe 5 U.S.C. § 5702(a). Division of Military & Naval Affairs, 683 F.2d at 49
(Oakes, J., dissenting).
196. Id.
197. Id. Oakes emphasized that of the FLRA's eight-page Interpretation, only one
small paragraph refers to "official business" under 5 U.S.C. § 5702. Id. at 50. The full

paragraph on the fifth page of the Interpretation,2 F.L.R.A. at 269, reads:
Neither the Statute, nor its legislative history expressly adverts to the payment of
travel expenses or per diem during participation in these negotiation activities.
However, it is well established that such expenses are authorized when an employee "is engaged on official business for the Government." (Chapter 57, Subchapter 1-TravelandSubsistanceExpenses;MileageAi4owances,5 U.S.C. § 5701,

et seq.) As already mentioned, Congress, in adopting the Statute, specifically
found in section 7101(a) that collective bargaining "contributes to the effective

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:17

Judge Oakes also found that, while the majority presented
some valid arguments, the FLRA's decision was defensible; thus,
the court had an obligation to uphold it. He relied on what he
perceived to be a "complete reversal of past practice regarding official time" to support a departure from past practice regarding
travel and per diem expenses.' 98 The specific finding that collective bargaining was in the public interest further supported the
conclusion that, unlike negotiators under the executive order era,
labor negotiators under Title VII are engaged in official government business. 199
In Department of Agriculture, Judge Heaney issued a sharp,
two-pronged attack on the majority's analysis. Unlike Judge
Oakes, Judge Heaney argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to
hear the agency's complaint. Specifically, he contended that, because the FLRA's Interpretationwas issued only after public comment in accordance with section 7105 of the Act, an aggrieved
party must have sought judicial review under the procedures detailed in the Act and, in any event, must have done so within sixty
days."°° The challenging agency, the United States Department of
Agriculture, was one of the agencies which submitted comments
objecting to payment of travel and per diem expenses prior to issuance of the Interpretation. The dissent asserted that if the Agriculture Department had been dissatisfied with the FLRA's
decision, its proper recourse would have been to seek direct judicial review of that decision.20 ' Instead, the Department of Agriculture, along with other federal agencies, chose a "circuit-bycircuit attack" on the decision, an approach characterized by
Judge Heaney as "nonsense," resulting only in "confusion, contradictory rulings, and a tremendous waste of judicial resources. ' 0 2
conduct of public business," and that "collective bargaining in the civil service [is]
in the public interest." Further, Congress expressly mandated in sections 7114
and 7116(a)(5) and (b)(5) that such negotiations be conducted in good faith by the
parties involved. (92 Stat. 1202, 1204). Thus, an employee, while negotiating a
collective bargaining agreement as a union representative and while on paid time
entitled to his or her usual compensation and not in a leave status, is clearly engaged on "official business for the Government."
683 F.2d at 50 n.2. Judge Oakes concluded from this that a strong argument can be made
that the FLRA first determined whether union representatives were entitled to travel and
per diem expenses under § 713 1(a) and only then concluded that these employees were on
"official business" within the meaning of § 5701. Id.
198. 683 F.2d at 50.
199. Id.
200. 691 F.2d at 1250 (Heaney, J., dissenting); see 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a) (1982).
201. 691 F.2d at 1250-51.
202. Id. at 1251.
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Judge Heaney also attacked the merits of the majority's decision, noting that: "In my view, regardless of whether one likes the
idea of paying travel expenses of federal employees to negotiate
with their employer, it seems clear that the FLRA has the authority to make such a determination and its determination is a reasonable one under the circumstances.2 0 3 The circumstances of
this case were, in Judge Heaney's view, controlled by an inconsistent past practice regarding both official time and travel and per
diem expenses.2 " Thus, he reasoned that the failure of Congress
to comment on travel and per diem expenses could not be construed as acceptance of some nebulous past prohibition.20 5
Rather, the question was one for the FLRA to decide subject to
reversal "only if its determination is unreasonable. 20 6 Judge Heaney concluded that the FLRA Interpretationwas reasonable and
that the majority, by reaching a contrary conclusion, improperly
interfered with the legitimate policy determination of the
20 7
FLRA.
2 °8 the Supreme
In Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms,
Court failed to address Judge Heaney's contention that the
agency's appeal was time-barred and, therefore, should have been
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. While Judge Heaney's point
was not raised in either the Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court, it has
considerable merit. It is true that under section 7123, an aggrieved party has sixty days within which to appeal a final order
of the FLRA. Moreover, while Title VII does not define "final
order," under the Administrative Procedure Act "order" refers to
a "final disposition. . . declaratory in form." 20 9 Thus, Judge Heaney appears correct inasserting that the Interpretationwas a final
order from which an appeal could have been taken. If the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms had submitted comments to the
FLRA prior to issuance of the Interpretation, then, as an aggrieved party, it would have been entitled to appeal the FLRA's
decision. 10 However, the circuit-by-circuit attack approach taken
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1252. Judge Heaney took issue with the majority's conclusion, asking:
"[W]here the prior practice is as inconsistent as it was here.. . can it truly be known
which prior practice Congress intended to reaffirm by its silence?" Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 104 S.Ct. 439 (1983).
209. 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (1982); see also DepartmentofAgriculture, 691 F.2d at 1250 n.1.
210. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms is a division of the Department of
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by federal agencies did little more than waste judicial resources
and generate confusion.
C.

The Supreme Court's View of Travel and Per Diem Expense
Reimbursement

In Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA,211 the
Supreme Court apparently resolved any question concerning
travel and per diem expenses. Justice Brennan, writing for a unanimous Court, rejected the FLRA's construction of the official time
provisions in 5 U.S.C. § 7131 and reversed the Ninth Circuit,
holding that federal agencies are not required to reimburse union
negotiators for their travel and per diem costs.2 12
At the outset, the Court considered the degree of deference to
be accorded the FLRA Interpretation. On the one hand, the
Court recognized that the "Authority is entitled to considerable
deference when it exercises its 'special function of applying the
general provisions of the Act to the complexities' of federal labor
relations."2 13 However, this proposition was countervailed by the
notion that such administrative decisions are enforceable only to
the extent they do not trammel on the policymaking sphere of
Congress.2 14 Since the disposition of the case required an interpretation of the Civil Service Reform Act, and ultimately a deteruination of the FLRA's power to establish official time policies
consistent with it, the importance of the deference issue cannot be
overstated.
Yet by setting the parameters so broadly, the Court subtly circumvented the deference issue. It failed to define the weight owed
an FLRA Interpretation,opting instead to consider portions of the
Civil Service Reform Act as construed by the agency.21 5 As a result, Justice Brennan was compelled to ascertain congressional intent in the face of silence both in the Act and its legislative history.
In the course of this analysis, the Court shifted still further from
the Treasury. Judge Heaney's dissent does not indicate whether this agency was one that
filed comments prior to issuance of the Interpretation;however, its vigorous opposition to
the Interpretationand the persistence of the National Treasury Employees Union make it
likely that the agency made its position known prior to the Interpretation.
211. 104 S.Ct. 439 (1983).
212. Id. at 441.
213. Id. at 444.
214. Id.
215. The Court noted that this case presented the first opportunity to review an FLRA
interpretation of the Act. Id

19831
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the deference issue, ultimately deciding the case by determining
the FLRA's power to act where the statute is silent.
Turning first to the status of federal labor relations pre-1978,
the Court reviewed official time policies under Executive Orders
10,988, 11,491, and 11,616.216 It highlighted the early limitations
on official time, the subsequent proscription under Executive Order 11,491, and the narrow authorization granted by Executive
Order 11,616.217 Next, the Court addressed the FLRA's argument
in support of travel and per diem reimbursement by turning to the
218
Act.
Justice Brennan found that the model of federal labor relations advanced by the FLRA had no support in the legislation. In
fact, he declared that to the extent the Act was intended to foster
more efficient government, principles of the executive order regime controlled.21 9 This finding enabled the Court to rely largely
on federal labor policies in effect before 1978 to interpret relevant
sections of the Civil Service Reform Act. Applying these tenets,
the Court declared that labor-management relations in the federal
sector "'proceed from contrary and to an extent antagonistic
viewpoints and concepts of self-interest.' ,220 Accordingly, the
Court asserted that economic inequalities are inherent in the federal collective bargaining model, and any attempt by the FLRA to
equalize the economic positions of labor and management was
improper.2 2 ' Such an action, the Court declared, constitutes an
outright usurpation of Congress' policymaking power and cannot
be tolerated. 2
D. A CriticalLook At Judicial Treatment of the Interpretation
To a large extent, the outcome of the Bureau of Alcohol case
depended on the degree of deference accorded the FLRA's Interpretation. In refusing to grant it the degree of deference normally
reserved for FLRA decisions, the Second, Eighth, and Eleventh
216. Id. at 445-46; see supra notes 15-66 and accompanying text.
217. 104 S.Ct. at 445-46.
218. Id. at 446-49.
219. Id. at 447. The Court found the congressional declaration that collective bargaining contributes to efficient government to be rooted in executive order principles. The
codification of the basic labor framework established by President Kennedy, although not
absolutely limiting, certainly established the guidelines for the FLRA, according to Justice
Brennan. Id.
220. Id. at 449 (quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 488 (1960)).
221. 104 S. Ct. at 449.
222. Id. at 450.
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Circuits observed that the FLRA relied on a statute outside its
area of expertise. 223 However, this relatively weak argument did
not sway the Supreme Court. The FLRA's contention that union
negotiators participating in collective bargaining engage in official
business for the government was a central part of its argument
supporting the decision to grant travel and per diem expenses.
Importantly, the focus of the FLRA's argument was not on what
was meant by "official business" in the context of 5 U.S.C.
§ 5702(a), but rather on the legislative intent underlying section
7131(a), a statute within its area of expertise. In other words, the
issue considered by the FLRA was whether Congress considered
collective bargaining to be "official business" when it passed Title
VII, not whether Congress had collective bargaining in mind
when it enacted section 5702. Thus, the Ninth Circuit and the
dissenting judges of the other circuits had a more persuasive argument when they declared the FLRA's discussion of section 5702 to
be merely incidental to, rather than dispositive of, its interpretation of section 7131.224
While a lesser degree of deference is warranted because the
Interpretation was issued as an interpretative rule,22 5 it probably
should be accorded a greater degree of deference than that given
by the Second, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits. However, for all
practical purposes, the issue escaped consideration by the
Supreme Court. Since their focus shifted to power, not deference,
this particular controversy became moot.
A strong argument can be made that, simply because Congress
found collective bargaining to be in the public interest, it does not
necessarily follow that union negotiators were on "official business" within the meaning of section 5702. The FLRA's argument
relied on the following syllogistic reasoning: (1) persons on official business under section 5702 are entitled to travel and per diem
expenses; 22 6 (2) union negotiators are involved in collective bargaining which furthers the effective conduct of public business
and is in the public interest; 227 and, therefore, (3) union negotia223. See supra notes 176-94 and accompanying text.
224. See Bureau of Alcohol, 672 F.2d at 737-38; Division of Afilitary & NavalAffairs,
683 F.2d at 49-50 (Oakes, J., dissenting); Department ofAgriculture, 691 F.2d at 1252 n.2
(Heaney, J., dissenting).
225. See Bureau of Alcohol, 672 F.2d at 735 (citing General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125, 141 (1976)).
226. Interpretationand Guidance, 2 F.L.R.A. No. 31 at 269.
227. Id. The first two suppositions are entirely correct. Section 5702 clearly provides
for travel and per diem expenses while § 7101 states unequivocally that collective bargain-
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tors are on official business and entitled to travel and per diem
expenses. The basic flaw in this logic is its reliance on the premise
that "effective conduct of the public business" is equivalent to "official business of the government." ' 8 The two terms are not necessarily synonymous.
The Second Circuit noted that section 7101 states that "statutory protection of collective bargaining furthers the public interest," 229 implying that the negotiation process itself does not
constitute a furtherance of public business. This argument, however, is suspect because the Second Circuit focused only upon a
portion of section 7101. Section 7101(a) states unequivocally that
"labor organizations and collective bargaining in the Civil Service
are in the public interest."" 0 Thus, the proper inquiry is whether
being in the "public interest" necessarily furthers the interest of
the federal government. The Eighth Circuit made a strong argument that it does not.231
This claim was made by citing a series of Comptroller General
Opinions issued in 1965 and 1966 for the proposition that employee representation in collective bargaining primarily benefits
the employees and their union, and only indirectly benefits the
agency by contributing to the effective conduct of its business.232
The FLRA challenged the precedential value of the Comptroller
General Opinions as they related to travel and per diem expenses
33
while on official time under the former executive order policy.2
Inasmuch as Congress radically changed the official time policy,
the FLRA contended that reliance on the Comptroller General
Opinions was misplaced.2 34 The Eighth Circuit rejected that arof
gument, noting that the decisions shed light on the meaning
"official business" apart from their official time context. 235
To the extent that those decisions are used for their general
interpretation of "official business" as being that which has a diing is in the public interest. As noted by the Eleventh Circuit in Florida Nat'l Guard: "The
great leap of faith occurs in moving to the conclusion that 'an employee, while negotiating
a collective bargaining agreement as a union representative and while on paid time entitled
to his or her usual compensation ...is clearly engaged on "official business for the Goveminent." '"699 F.2d at 1086 (quoting 2 F.L.R.A. No. 31 at 269).
228. See Florida Nat'l Guard, 699 F.2d at 1086-87.
229. Division ofMilitary & Naval Affairs, 683 F.2d at 48 (emphasis in original).

230. 5 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (1982).
231. See Department of(Agriculture, 691 F.2d 1242 (8th Cir. 1982).

232.
233.
234.
235.

Id. at 1248 & n. 11;see supra note 130 and accompanying text.
691 F.2d at 1248.
Id.
Id. at 1248 n.1l.
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rect benefit to the government, the decisions do have a continuing
precedential value. A persuasive argument can be made that a
general policy statement alluding to "public interest" and to "effective conduct of the public business" may provide an intangible
benefit to the public at large. Although the federal agency does
not necessarily receive a direct benefit within the requirements of
"official business" under section 5702, it is arguable that the populace does.
Under the executive orders, collective bargaining clearly was
not considered to further governmental interests. Thus, although
union representatives were allowed official time, they were not
generally allowed travel and per diem expenses.2 36 The Ninth
238
Circuit 237 and the dissenting judges from the other circuits
agreed that Title VII represents a complete change in policy from
practices under the executive orders. The fact that Congress chose
to include a special finding regarding the contribution of collective
bargaining to the efficient conduct of public business and, in a
broader sense, to the public interest, reflects this change. The
FLRA's decision to award travel and per diem expenses therefore
actually furthered the expressly stated goal of Congress.
Related to this argument is the FLRA's contention that Congress intended to equalize the positions of union and management
negotiators. Although this intent is not expressly stated in Title
VII, it may be gleaned from the whole statutory scheme which
does equalize the parties with respect to official time. Certainly, if
parity is deemed a congressional goal, the award of travel and per
diem expenses does much to achieve that end. Without reimbursement for expenses, the unions are still at a tremendous
financial disadvantage in the collective bargaining process.
In Department ofArgriculture, the Eighth Circuit noted, however, that Congress created certain inequities in enacting Title
VII. For instance, union representatives, unlike agency representatives, may receive official time only when they otherwise would
be in duty status.23 9 Under this construction, if negotiations take
place on a weekend, union negotiators would not be compensated
for their time unless they normally work weekends. Agency negotiators, on the other hand, theoretically could receive paid time.
236. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
237. Bureau of Alcohol, 672 F.2d at 736-37.
238. DepartmentofAgriculture, 691 F.2d at 1251-52 (Heaney, J., dissenting); Division of
Military & NavalAffairs, 683 F.2d at 50 (Oakes, J., dissenting).

239. 691 F.2d at 1250 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
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The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits both argued that, by granting union representatives travel and per diem expenses, the FLRA
tipped the balance in favor of the unions, noting that union dues
are collected for the purpose of financing negotiations. z4° The obvious implication of this argument is that unions will receive a
windfall if given federal reimbursement. This in turn will provide
a disincentive to reach quick settlements in negotiation. Such an
argument is a dangerously deceptive one, especially when combined with the claim that reimbursement for expenses in the private sector is an extraordinary remedy used only in response to
the most egregious employer misconduct. 24 1
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court appears to have adopted this
rationale. Despite the vast differences between public and private
unions the Court equated them relative to collective bargaining.
By recognizing that management and labor are at odds in both the
public and private sectors, proceeding "'from contrary and to an
extent antagonistic viewpoints,' ,242 the Court sanctioned structural inequality in the federal sector.
The most compelling argument advanced by the Supreme
Court for reversal of the Interpretationwas that nowhere in either
the express language of the statute or in the congressional debates
was the issue of travel and per diem expenses mentioned.2 43 Although the Court acknowledged that Congress intended a policy
shift regarding federal labor relations, the critical question remained: did Congress intend to alter the policy so radically as to
grant travel and per diem expense? The Court thought not.2'
While "acquiescence by silence" is a troublesome rule of statutory construction, it nevertheless was utilized in BureauofAlcohol.
The Court inferred that by its silence, Congress intended to abide
by past practice under the executive order regime. 24 5 In fact, the
Court found the Act's declaration that "collective bargaining contributes to efficient government and therefore serves the public interest" not to signal labor-management equalization, but to
constitute legislative endorsement of federal labor policies under
240. See supra notes 187-88 & 190-91 and accompanying text.
241. Private sector practice does not correspond to the federal sector model since federal labor organizations do not have the financial resources currently available to private
sector unions. Thus, federal union dues are insufficient to finance both negotiation activities and necessary expenses associated with grievance arbitration.
242. 104 S.Ct. at 449 (quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 488 (1960)).
243. 104 S.Ct. at 445.
244. Id. at 449.
245. See id. at n.17.
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the executive orders.2 46 Although Judge Heaney's dissent in Department ofAgriculture suggested that past practice was inconsistent,24 7 the Court was correct in noting that travel and per diem
expenses generally were not allowed under the executive orders.2 4
Congress presumptively is aware of past practice; thus, the
failure to address the issue, either in debate or statute, indicates
acceptance of it. The FLRA, in issuing its Interpretation,relied on
broad policy statements found in section 7101 to support its desire
to alter past practice. However, it seems clear that the Authority
stretched those policies somewhat in justifying its decision. Significantly, the FLRA and federal unions have argued that the Interpretation achieves two important policy goals of Title VII,
namely: (1) greater equalization of bargaining positions, and (2) a
more efficient conduct of public business. By reimbursing unions
for travel and per diem expenses, the argument goes, labor and
management's positions are effectively equalized. In the process,
the disparity between agency and union power is eliminated and
the collective bargaining process becomes more effective. However the Supreme Court refused to validate this line of reasoning.
With no legislative history to support it, the FLRA found that
Congress intended to adopt an official time policy which finances
union negotiation at taxpayer expense, but the Court was unwilling to make such a leap. In an age of increasing budget deficits
and acute fiscal consciousness, the Court refused to accept the
supposition that Congress intended to impose a huge obligation
on the federal government without once referring to the expenditure. In fact, the Court expressly recognized the inherent inequality in labor-management bargaining positions.2 4 9 Perhaps this,
coupled with the huge outlay reimbursement of travel and per
diem expenses would require, explains the Court's result.
Yet without travel and per diem expense reimbursement, federal unions are only a little better off than they were before enactment of the Civil Service Reform Act despite a significant policy
shift toward more balanced federal sector labor relations. By reversing the Ninth Circuit and overruling the Interpretation, the
Court cut back on those gains federal unions had made since 1979
and effectively gave controlling weight to economic considerations.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. at 447.
See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
104 S. Ct. at 449.
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E. FPM Letter 711-162: The Controversy Continues
On January 19, 1984, less than two months after the Supreme
Court's decision in Bureau of-Akcohol, Donald J. Devine, Director
of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), issued a guidance
in response to the Court's opinion. 5 0 It advised government
agencies that payment of travel and per diem expenses is not contemplated by section 7131 of the Act, and accordingly should be
discontinued even if covered by an existing collective bargaining
agreement. The Letter further stated that travel and per diem expense reimbursement is outside the scope of bargaining.
After summarizing the decision, OPM set forth its interpretation. It initially declared that travel and per diem expenses are
beyond the purview of section 7131(a) of the Act.2 51 As such,
OPM advised government agencies to discontinue these payments,
if made in reliance on the FLRA interpretation of section 713 1(a)

or "under contract provisions utilizing the general term 'official
time.' "252
The second point was a drastic departure from the spirit of the
Civil Service Reform Act. OPM articulated the rule for agencies
to follow in granting travel and per diem expenses: such expenditures are prohibited unless exceptional circumstances show they
would be in the government's best interests, as measured by what
is most convenient for the agency.25 3 This pronouncement will, if
effectuated, return federal labor policy concerning official time to
1966 Comptroller General standards. In fact, the Director relied
on the Civil Service Commission guidelines enunciated in 1966 to
prescribe the narrow set of circumstances that will permit payment of travel and per diem expenses. 254 Ultimately, OPM would
have authorization for reimbursement depend not solely on
whether the government's best interests are furthered, but on "specific facts and reasons which will demonstrate clearly that the convenience of the agency is best served [by travel and per diem
reimbursement]."2 55
250. Federal PersonnelManual Letter 711-162, [Jan.- June] GOV'T EMPL. REL. REp.

(BNA)
251.
252.
253.

No. 1046, at 147 (Jan. 19, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Letter 711-162].
Id. at 148.
Id.
Id. at 149. OPM added that for payment to be authorized under the rule, the

exception "must be supported by a certification from the agency head-and accompanying
explanation--that the travel would be in the primary interest of the government." Id.
254. Id.; see 46 Comp. 21 (1966).
255. Letter 711-162, supra note 250, at 149.
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This mischaracterized the Court's opinion. Although the
Court did recognize that payment of travel and per diem expenses
is warranted where it serves the convenience of the agency,25 6 this
was not the sole ground for authorization, as the Director suggested. Rather, an agency may make such payments, according to
the Court, when they "serve the convenience of the agency or are
otherwise in the primary interest of the government, as was the
practice prior to passage of the Act."2 7 OPM's guidance erased
the second factor by stating that "even if a particular situation
meets the 'primary interest of the Government' test, this does not
mean that an agency is required to pay, or necessarily ought to
pay" travel and per diems.2 58
The third conclusion drawn in the OPM Letter dealt with the
party which determines when travel and per diem reimbursement
is necessary. The Letter concluded that discretion "is reserved
solely and exclusively to the agency."25' 9 Again relying on 1966
Comptroller General standards, Mr. Devine declared that an
agency may decide to confer travel status on an employee representative under 5 U.S.C. § 5702 only when a benefit to the government's primary interest can be demonstrated.2 60 Accordingly, the
Letter precluded union and FLRA input into the decision, purportedly relying on the Court's decision.2 61
Apparently this section was designed to eliminate any future
bargaining over travel and per diem expenses, and to buttress the
order in paragraph 7(a) that agencies paying travel and per diem
expenses pursuant to an existing collective bargaining agreement

cease doing so.262 The Letter looked to the Supreme Court's opinion to support the proposition that the FLRA plays no part in
such a determination. However, contrary to the Letter's assertion,
at no point in the decision is the preclusion of the FLRA "clearly
256. Bureau ofAkcohol, 104 S.Ct. at 449 & n.17.
257. Id. at 449 n.17 (emphasis added). The Court read the 1966 Comptroller General's
decision as providing reimbursement for travel expenses "if an agency head certified that
the employee representatives' travel would be in the 'primary interest of the government.'"
Id. at 446 n. 11. This contrasts sharply with Director Devine's assertion that before authorization for payment is appropriate, a specific factual showing must be made that an
agency's convenience is served by reimbursement. See Letter 711-162, supra note 250, at
149.
258. Letter 711-162, supra note 250, at 149.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. See id. at 148.
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indicated."2 6' 3
The Letter attempted to isolate the FLRA further from all involvement in travel and per diem expense reimbursement by de-

claring in paragraph 7(d) that such a determination is not
bargainable under the Act.2" To garner support for this conclusion, OPM turned, in paragraph 7(e), to the Bureau of Alcohol
decision, specifically to footnote seventeen.2 65 OPM asserted that
the footnote "does not establish an obligation or authorization to

bargain over travel and per diem payments for employee union
negotiators.

266

OPM classified the Court's statement that "'un-

ions may presumably negotiate for such payments in collective
bargaining as they do in the private sector' ",267 as "dictum . . . of
no precedential value" 268 in the federal sector. Expanding upon
this, OPM attempted to emasculate the Court's language further

by stating that any travel and per diem clauses in existing labor
contracts were included only because of the FLRA policy invalidated by the Court.2 69 Thus, OPM reasoned that since the Court's

language was dictum and since contracts permitting travel and per
diem reimbursement were founded on a policy struck down by the
Supreme Court, payment of such expenses has no place in federal
labor relations. 270
The Letter is simply management's explanation of the
Supreme Court decision to lower level managers. Although the

Letter appears drastic, it supports the OPM position taken prior to
Bureau ofAlcohol.27 OPM placed a strained interpretation on the
263. Id. at 149.
264. Id. at 149-50.
265. Id. at 150. Footnote 17 of Bureau of41cohol appears to be at the hub of the
controversy over travel and per diem expenses as a continuing, proper subject of bargainig. The footnote reads:
Our conclusion that federal agencies may not be required under § 7131(a) to
pay the travel expenses and per diem allowances of union negotiators does not, of
course, preclude an agency from making such payments upon a determination
that they serve the convenience of the agency or are otherwise in the primary
interest of the government, as was the practice prior to passage of the Act ...
Furthermore, unions may presumably negotiate for such payments in collective
bargaining as they do in the private sector. . . . Indeed, we are informed that
many agencies presently pay the travel expenses of employee representatives pursuant to collective-bargaining agreements. Letter from Ruth E. Peters, Counsel
for Respondent. FLRA, Nov. 9, 1983....
104 S.Ct. at 449 n.17 (citations omitted).
266. Letter 711-162, supra note 250, at 150.
267. Id. (emphasis added by OPM).
268. Id. (emphasis in original).
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court's decision by mixing and matching various bits
and pieces of the opinion. The Court taught us what Congress did
not intend in section 7131 of the Act, yet OPM construed the opinion to tell us what Congress meant in full. This peculiar interpretation of the Court has not gone unaddressed.2 72 One union has
already filed suit in an effort to have Mr. Devine's guidance declared null and void. 73 Perhaps the best answer to the OPM Letter is to be found in a travel and per diem arbitration involving
the General Services Administration and the American Federation of Government Employees. 7 4 The arbitrator advanced persuasive arguments to support rejection of OPM's contentions that
the Bureau of Alcohol decision has foreclosed negotiations on
travel and per diem reimbursement, and that clauses in existing
collective bargaining agreements providing for reimbursement be
abandoned.
Despite the promise of a Supreme Court resolution of the
troublesome travel and per diem issue, the FPM Letter has clearly
revived the dispute. Like the reimbursement issue, the negotiability question posed by the Letter will ultimately need to be addressed by the FLRA and the federal courts.
IV.

THE CURRENT STATUS OF OFFICIAL TIME

Apart from mid-term negotiations and travel expense per diem
272. Robert M. Tobias, National President of the National Treasury Employees Union,
attacked the OPM Letter, stating: "'Though OPM Director Donald Devine is notorious
for his attempts to thwart the intent of Congress, he has sunk to new depths with his nosethumbing at the Supreme Court."' NTEU Sues to Block OPM Effort To Bar Negotiations
On Travel, [Jan.-June] GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 1047, at 166 (Jan. 23, 1984).
Kenneth T. Blaylock, American Federation of Government Employees National President,
also vehemently opposes the OPM letter, characterizing it as "a misreading of [t]he
Supreme Court's opinion." OPMAdvises Agencies Not To Bargain over Travel,Per Diem
For Negotiators, [Jan.-June] GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 1046, at 115 (Jan. 16,
1984).
273. National Treasury Employees Union v. Devine, No. 84-0205 (D.C.D.C. Filed
Jan. 19, 1984). As set forth in its complaint, the union is seeking both declaratory and
injunctive reliefPlaintiff, National Treasury Employees Union ("NTEU") seeks declaratory
judgment that the FPM publication is in excess of the Director's statutory authority, and a usurpation of the role of the Federal Labor Relations Authority, which
is statutorily charged with defining the scope of collective bargaining in federal
sector labor relations. NTEU further seeks declaratory judgment that the FPM
Letter was improperly promulgated and that its directives are contrary to law, and
an order requiring the withdrawal of the FPM Letter.
Complaint at 2.
274. General Services Administration, [Jan.-June] GOV'T EMPL. RaL. REP. (BNA) No.
1052, at 419 (Jan. 30, 1984) (Angelo, Arb.).
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issues decided by the FLRA in its Interpretation, the Authority
has answered a number of questions that have arisen under section 7131 and various other sections of the Act. The developing
body of case law has had a significant effect on federal labor-management negotiations.
A. Section 7131
Although the FLRA determined in its Interpretation that union representatives were entitled to official time under section
713 1(a) for mid-contract negotiations, many other questions arose
challenging the scope of that section. In FloridaNational Guard,
the FLRA held that an agency committed an unfair labor practice
when it refused to provide official time to an employee who was
required to travel to participate in official time activities under
section 7131(a).27 5 In that case, the union president had attended
both days of a Federal Service Impasses Panel factfinding hearing,
requiring travel time of three hours per day. His regular work day
was seven and three-quarter hours, from 6:30 a.m. to 3:15 p.m.
The agency, however, awarded six hours of official time, the time
actually spent in the hearings. In response to the union's unfair
labor practice complaint, the FLRA found that the union president would have been in a regular duty status from 6:30 a.m. to
3:15 p.m. on those days but for his attendance at the hearings.
Consequently, the Authority found that he was entitled to seven
and three-quarter hours of official time for each of the two
2 76
days.
In several other cases, however, the FLRA restricted the scope
of official time under section 7131(a). In one case, the FLRA refused to find an unfair labor practice where an agency refused to
bargain over the makeup of its negotiating team. By reducing its
force of negotiators, the agency limited the union's collective bargaining team to an equal number of negotiators on official time.
In support of its refusal to find an unfair labor practice, the FLRA
cited a previous decision in which it held that a proposal for
a minimum number of negotiators from each party was not
negotiable.2 77
In another Interpretationand Guidance, the FLRA held that
official time need not be granted to union negotiators engaged in
275. 5 F.L.R.A. 365, F.L.1LA. No. 49 (1981).

276. Id. at 367.
277. Department of the Air Force, Space Div., 6 F.L.RIA. 439, F.L.RtA. No. 78 (1981)
(citing National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 3 F.L.RA. 87, F.L.R.A. No. 14 (1980)).
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supplemental bargaining. According to the FLRA, section
7131(a) requires the payment of official time only at the negotiation level where the Civil Service Reform Act requires collective
bargaining. According to the Act, supplemental bargaining occurs at the parties' discretion. Therefore, because the parties were
not obligated to engage in the extra bargaining,
the Act did not
278
require official time for such activity.
In another apparent restriction on the use of official time, the
FLRA ruled that official time need only be paid to union negiotiators who are members of the bargaining unit covered by the
agreement. The FLRA supported this decision by examining the
statement of purpose in Title VII and other provisions of the Civil
Service Reform Act. Accordingly, an unfair labor practice charge
filed for refusal to pay official time was dismissed because the
union, representing fire fighters from the Air Base Wing Headquarters, requested the Wing to authorize official time for fire
fighters also represented by the union who were employed by the
Defense Electronics Supply Center.27 9 But aside from these restrictive cases, the FLRA has generally construed section 713 1(a)
liberally.
Prohibitions against official time for internal union activities
contained in section 713 1(b) also have generated several interpretive questions. The typical case involves a refusal by an agency to
negotiate over a union proposal that would grant official time to
certain union representatives. The agency generally contends that
the proposal would violate section 713 1(b) because it would allow
the union representative to conduct internal union business on
duty time. The FLRA must then decide if a proposal does violate
section 7131(b) or if it is negotiable under section 7131(d).280
In American Federation of Government Employees, Local
2823,281 the first case interpreting section 7131(b), the FLRA nar278. Interpretation and Guidance, 7 F.L.R.A. 682, F.L.R.A. No. 105 (1982); Vf. Division of Military & Naval Affairs, 7 F.L.R.A. 321, F.L.R.A. No. 51 (1981) (agency must first
agree to grant of official time for periods spent in preparation for collective bargaining
before union representatives may receive official time for preparation activity).
279. United States Air Force, 2750th Air Base Wing Headquarters, Air Force Logistics
Command, 7 F.L.R.A. 738, F.L.R.A. No. 118 (1982); see also Department of the Air Force
Logistics Command, 10 F.L.R.A. 245, F.L.R.A. No. 46 (1982); Department of Defense, Air
Force, 93rd Combat Support Group, 9 F.L.R.A. 635, F.L.R.A. No. 71 (1982); United States
Naval Space Surveillance Sys., 9 F.L.R.A. 193, F.L.R.A. No. 30 (1982); Department of
Army, 94th United States Army Reserve Command, 8 F.L.R.A. 83, F.L.tLA. No. 13
(1982).
280. For the full text of § 7131(b) and (d), see supra notes 98 & 100.
281. 2 F.L.R.A. 4, F.L.R.A. No. 1 (1979).
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rowly construed the term "internal union business." It addressed
the negotiability of a union proposal seeking to grant the union
president or his designees two hours of official time daily for preparation of reports required under section 7120 of the statute. The
FLRA held that the union proposal was negotiable and not inconsistent with section 7131(b).28 2 In its analysis, the FLRA examinned the plain meaning of section 7131(b) and determined that
on its face the statute does not expressly define "internal union
business." Instead, the provision cites some examples of activities
that are related to the "internal business of a labor organization,"
for example, solicitation of membership, election of labor organization officials, and collection of dues. The FLRA concluded that
no relationship existed between these activities and the activities
contained in the union's proposal.2 83
The FLRA next examined the legislative history of section
7131(b) and concluded that a narrow construction of "internal
union business" was consistent with congressional intent regarding the provision."' The FLRA pointed out that the language of
the official time provision in the version of the bill which was
eventually enacted and signed into law was identical to that of
both the House Committee and House bills.28 5 The report that
accompanied the House Committee bill indicated that this provision was intended to require "that matters solely relating to the
internal business of a labor organization be performed when an
employee is in a non-duty status."28' 6 The FLRA noted further
that proponents of the bill intended the provision on official time
to apply only to activities regarding the "structure and institution"
of the labor organization. The FLRA reasoned that the examples
noted in section 713 1(b) had been included because the purpose of
those activities related to maintenance of the union's institutional
structure.28 7
The FLRA asserted that the reports which were the subject of
the union's proposal in Local 2823 did not relate solely to the
structure and institution of the labor organization. Rather, the re282. Id. at 10.
283. Id. at 5.
284. Id. at 5-7; see also Department of Health & Human Services, 11 F.L.R.A. 7,
F.L.R.A. No. 5 (1983) (FLRA enforced arbitration award holding legislative chairman's
activities not violative of section 7131(b)).
285. 2 F.L.R.A. No. I at 5-6.
286. Id. at 6 (emphasis in original); see H.R. REP. No. 1403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 58-59

(1978).
287. 2 F.L.R.A. No. 1 at 8.
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ports' purpose was to provide a disclosure mechanism to aid in
implementing the public policy of the statute.2 z8 Accordingly, the
FLRA declared the union proposal negotiable.
Relying on this decision, the FLRA has consistently found a
number of union proposals granting official time to be negotiable.
For example, a union proposal "providing that equal official time
to prepare for contract negotiations be allotted to the union and
management negotiators" ' 9 was held to be negotiable under section 7131 (d). The FLRA concluded that preparation for contract
negotiations could not be construed as "internal union business,"
but was a subject of mutual concern to both the union and management.2 9 ° Similarly, a proposal to grant "reasonable official
time . . .to union representatives for preparations for negotiations, and impasse resolutions and counterproposals" was held to
be a matter of mutual concern and, thus, negotiable under section
7131(d).2 91 The FLRA reached the same conclusion concerning a
proposal that "all preparation of proposals and impasse resolutions shall be on duty time."2'92
One could conclude from these cases that performance of internal union business during duty hours will be declared non-negotiable unless the employee is in a non-duty status.2 93 In one case,29 4
however, the FLRA reviewed an administrative law judge's decision which held that the agency had violated section 7116(a) by
maintaining a rule prohibiting solicitation of union membership
during all paid breaks. The judge noted a long recognized distinction between "duty time'' 95 and "actual working time" to the effect that no-solicitation rules which seek to prohibit solicitation
during all duty time violate the rights of employees. The FLRA
288. Id. at 9.
289. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1692, 3 F.L.R.A. 304, F.L.R.A. No. 47
(1980).
290. Id. at 308; accord, National Labor Relations Bd., Washington, D.C., 6 F.L.R.A.
213, F.L.R.A. No. 36 (1981) (preparation for impasse not activity automatically entitled to
official time, but negotiable under § 7131(d)); International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Lodge 2424, 5 F.L.R.A. 438, F.L.R.A. No. 54 (1981) (union proposal to
grant official time for time spent in reasonable, necessary contract preparation negotiable
under § 7131(d) where such activity in public interest).
291. Federal Uniformed Firefighters, Local F-169, 3 F.L.R.A. 316, F.L.R.A. No. 49
(1980).
292. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 225, 4 F.L.R.A. 148, F.L.R.A. No. 24
(1980).
293. See H. ROBINSON, supra note 131, at 168.
294. Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, 6 F.L.R.A. 159, F.LR.A. No. 32 (1981).
295. Duty time, or clock time, refers to the entire block of time that an employee is
actually present at the work site. Id. at 162.
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adopted the administrative law judge's decision concerning the
no-solicitation rule and added that such time (paid free time)
"falls within the meaning of the term 'non-duty status' as used in
section 7131(b)."2 96
National Treasury Employees Union29 7 involved the question

of whether a union proposal providing for distribution of chapter
announcement cards by a union representative on official time
was consistent with the agency's duty to bargain. The FLRA held
that the union proposal did not violate section 7131(b), reasoning
that "advising employees of the union's status as the exclusive representative contributed to implementing the labor-management
relationship and is not solely related to the institutional structure
of the union.""29
It appears that the FLRA will continue to interpret section

7131(b) narrowly, consequently broadening the range of bargainable or negotiable proposals under section 7131(d).2 99 Presently,
the only proposals not considered to be negotiable are those relating solely to the structure and institution of the labor organization,

such as: solicitation of membership, election of labor organization
officials, and collection of dues. 300 All other proposals which do
not violate any government-wide rule, regulation, or federal law

will be negotiable and within the agency's duty to bargain. While
the FLRA has rarely interpreted provisions of section 7131(c),

301

its authorization of official time for participants in FLRA proceedings is clear. The phrase "any phase of any proceeding before
the Authority" includes the investigation of unfair labor practice

charges and representation petitions as well as participation in
296. Id; see also National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 75, 8 F.L.R.A. 403, F.L.R.A.
No. 85 (1982) (proposal recognizing Union right to solicit membership during nonwork
time in nonwork areas and work area, when no employee is working; held negotiable).
297. 6 F.L.R.A. 508, F.L.R.A. No. 97 (1981).
298. Id. at 519.
299. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1692, 3 F.L.R.A. 304, F.L.R.A.
No. 47 (1980). In many cases interpreting § 7131(b), the decision has resulted in a redefinition of the range of subjects negotiable under § 7131(d). In National Treasury Employees
Union, 3 F.L.R.A. 495, F.L.R.A. No. 78 (1980), the FLRA denied a request for a general
statement of policy concerning the interpretation of § 7131(d). The union requested that
the FLRA determine whether employees on official time under § 713 1(d) who represent an
exlusive bargaining agent are entitled to reimbursement from agencies for their travel and
per diem expenses. The FLRA held that the standards governing the issuance of general
statements of policy and guidance precluded making such a statement since other means
for resolving the issue existed. Id. at 497.
300. H. RoBINsoN, supra note 131, at 167.
301. For the text of subsection (c), see supra note 70.
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hearings and representation elections.3 °2 The term "Authority" as
used in section 713 1(c) is interpreted to include the General Counsel, any administrative law judge, regional director, hearing officer, or other designated agent of the Authority.30 3 Further, the
FLRA has declared that any employee receiving official time
under section 7131(c) shall also receive travel time as well as
travel and per diem expenses. 3" In the only FLRA decision to
address the scope of section 7131(c), the Authority held that an
employee who had been instructed by an FLRA field attorney to
meet with her in preparation for an unfair labor practice case was
entitled to official time and expenses under the statute.30 5
B.

Official Time Cases Outside the Context of Section 7131

There have been several cases in which the FLRA has been
asked to resolve negotiability or unfair labor practice disputes
concerning official time outside the context of section 7131. Most
of these cases have involved a negotiability dispute over a union
proposal to grant official time for union-sponsored training. In
NationalFederationofFederalEmployees, Local951 ,3 for example, the union offered the following proposal:
a. For each employee, 8 hours per year for education.
b. For each Union member, an additional 8 hours per year
for grievance and other training.
c. For each Union officer, an additional 16 hours per year for
advanced grievance training.
d. Officers and stewards recognized by Management will be
granted excused leave to attend off premises Union Sponsored Training. Requests for such excused leave must be
provided to the Regional Personnel and Management Officer as far in advance as practical but in any event not later
30 7
than 5 working days in advance of the training session.
The agency refused to bargain over the proposal, asserting that it
violated the Comptroller General's rulings regarding the use of
official time. Specifically, the agency claimed that, under the
Comptroller General's decisions, the use of official time must be
confined to employee representatives and may not be used for
other bargaining unit members unless jointly sponsored by union
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

5 C.F.R. § 2429.13 (1983).
Id.
Id.
United States Dep't of Justice, 10 F.L.R.A. 662, F.L.R.A. No. 109 (1982).
3 F.L.R.A. 883, F.L.R.A. No. 128 (1980).
Id. at 884.
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and management. °8 In addition, the agency contended that section (d) of the proposal would also conflict with Comptroller Genand
eral decisions as it failed to impose limits on the officers'
30 9
training.
union-sponsored
for
time
official
of
use
stewards'
The FLRA found that sections (a), (c) and (d) of the union
proposal did not violate any government-wide rule or regulation,
including the Comptroller General decisons and, thus, were
within the agency's duty to bargain.3

10

The FLRA ruled that the

Comptroller General's decisions did not place an absolute limit on
the amount of official time authorized for union-sponsored training, but merely established "broad guidelines for agencies to use
in granting such leave to accommodate the particular circumstances ' 311 of each agency. However, the FLRA held that section
(b) of the union proposal was not within the duty to bargain because it provided benefits to union members which were not provided to nonmembers. 1 2 Such a proposal violated section
7114(a)(1) which "mandates that an exclusive representative is responsible for representing the interests of all employees in the
unit," 3 13 regardless of labor organization membership.
In a similar case, the FLRA approved a union proposal granting as much as forty-eight hours of administrative leave within a
twelve-month period for union officials to attend union-sponsored
training.314 Likewise, the Authority found in another case that a
union proposal granting eighty hours of official time each year for
representatives' union-sponsored training was within the agency's
duty to bargain because it was mutually beneficial and did not
violate any standards established by the Comptroller General. 1 5
In both cases, the FLRA cited its decision in NationalFederation
31 6
of FederalEmployees, Local 951 to support its conclusion.

In 1977, the Comptroller General reconsidered his 1966 administrative leave ruling in view of the burgeoning field of federal
labor relations. He ruled that:
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
(1981).
315.
(1981).
316.

Id. at 885.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 886.
Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 7114(b) (1982).
National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 238, 4 F.L.R.A. 785, F.L.R.A. No. 101
American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1733,5 F.L.R.A. 295, F.L.R.A. No. 40
5 F.L.R.A. No. 40 at 296; 4 F.L.R.A. No. 101 at 786.
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[The guidance in our 1966 decision was deliberately stated in
nondefinite terms in order to provide agencies with flexibility to
accommodate the myriad situations they face as a result of their
individual circumstances and particular requirements. While
the majority of agencies would not be justified in granting more
than 8 hours of administrative leave per year for employee representatives to attend union-sponsored training, we recognize
that some agencies must have limited authority
to exceed this
3 17
guideline by reasonable amounts of time.

Thus, proposals to grant official time or administrative leave will
be found to be within an agency's duty to bargain if the proposal
(1) does not discriminate against nonunion employees, (2) does
not violate the broad guidelines set forth by the Comptroller General, and (3) does not violate any other government-wide rule or
regulation. 1
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING OFFICIAL TIME

The use of official time by union representatives in federal sector labor-management relations has increased significantly since
passage of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. This has resulted in increased costs to the taxpaying public, provoking criticism not only from agency management but also from the press
and special interest groups that keep a watchful eye on public sector unions.
The Public Research Council and Americans Against Union
Control and Government have argued that public sector unions
have too much power and should be curbed. In 1978, the former
group, in an attempt to ascertain the total amount of official time
that federal employees representing unions spend on labor relations activities, filed Freedom of Information Act requests with
agencies having union bargaining units.3 19 Critics seem to sense
that the official time devoted to labor relations activities of federal
employees considerably exceeds the time spent on analogous activities in the private sector since in the latter such time is usually
authorized only for arbitration hearings and interviews with supervisors in connection with a grievance. However, the public sector model contemplates more extensive employee activity, perhaps
explaining the dissatisfaction.
317. Comp. Gen. ClarfFesRuling on Official Time for Union-Sponsored Training, [Jan.June] GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 698, at 4 (Feb. 28, 1977).
318. See supra text accompanying notes 306-15.
319. See FOA Exemption Did Not Bar Release of Names of Local Union Officials,
[Jan.-June] GOV'T EMp. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 910, at 7 (Apr. 9, 1981).
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There are a number of guidelines agency management might
follow to curtail potential abuse of official time. An agency could
negotiate specific regulations; that is, at the bargaining table, management might insist on detailed official time provisions, specifying amounts of time to be authorized and procedures to be
followed in obtaining and reporting official time. For example,
management might insist on reaching an agreement precisely detailing the maximum number of hours or maximum percentage of
worktime that any single union representative could be away from
the job. Thus, management might oppose using "reasonable
time" in agreements since the term has proved to be vague and
uncertain in its enforcement. Similarly, if the union wants to increase the amount of official time, management could require
proof that the increase is needed.
If management does not negotiate an absolute maximum limit
on official time, it might desire to provide for a pool of union representatives, each of whom would be limited in the number of
hours a week that he or she could be away from work. Through
this mechanism, management could be assured that no single job
would be severly affected by absenteeism.
Specific procedures regarding use of official time might also be
established. For example, the collective bargaining agreement
might clearly spell out whether a union representative need obtain
prior management approval for release on official time. Clearly
the best place to establish procedures for recording and authorizing official time is at the bargaining table. By conferring with the
union, considering its proposals, and either implementing them or
rejecting them for reason, a more desirable official time structure
will evolve.
An efficient system for authorizing and recording the use of
official time will also help minimize official time abuses. Federal
Personnel Manual Letter 711-161 gives agencies broad discretion
concerning the maintenance of official time records.32 Agencies
320. Office of Personnel Management, FPMLetter 711-161 (July 31, 1981). At a minimum, agency official time records are to collect information in the following categories: (1)
official time spent in negotiation or renegotiation of a collective bargaining agreement or

pursuant to a contract reopener clause; (2) official time for mid-term negotiations; (3) official time in connection with ongoing labor-management relations; (4) official time for
grievances and appeals; and (5) travel and per diem expenses. Id. at 3-4.
Although OPM stressed that agencies are free to maintain more detailed records if they
so choose, it cautioned that agencies were required to consult with unions before implementing a new recordkeeping system. The Letter also warned that agencies should not
negate any contractual provisions in effect on the date of the Letter. Id. at 3.
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may wish to consider the following facors in implementing recordkeeping procedures. First, an agency should discourage excessive
use of official time for frivolous discussions. Second, some means
are needed to ensure that the time is not being used for internal
3
union business, such as those proscribed under section 713 1(b). 11
Third, there should be included some mechanisms for striking a
balance between meeting the work needs of the agency and avoiding management interference with legitimate representational
rights of employees.
To accomplish these objectives, the following procedures may
be useful: (1) the union representative should check with the immediate supervisor and indicate the type of activity to be pursued
(grievance discussion, conference, bargaining session, hearing,
etc.) as well as the amount of time anticipated for it; (2) an employee might be required to call ahead to the department where he
intends to go to arrange a convenient time for consultation; (3) at
the destination the employee should report to the supervisor on
duty and a record should be made of arrival and departure times;
(4) on returning to his workplace, an employee should report to
the supervisor and record the total time used on a tally
sheet-actual bills for travel and per diem expenses might also be
presented; and (5) if management has negotiated a maximum
number of hours for official time, it should be certain that no employee representative exceeds that amount without notice to the
employer so that management does not risk establishing a practice
of permitting employees to exceed negotiated maximums. Ideally,
these procedures could help federal agencies accommodate their
responsibilities while also maintaining the high level of productivity essential to functioning as a federal agency.
VI.

CONCLUSION

As federal labor organizations have grown in number and
power, the concept of official time has become increasingly essential to effective union representation. Without an official time policy, union negotiators are at a huge disadvantage. Negotiation
becomes the ideal rather than the reality. Congress acknowledged
the public importance of a productive, cooperative bargaining
structure by adopting the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Implicit in the radical changes brought about by the Act is a recognition that, unless the bargaining positions of labor and
321. See 5 U.S.C. § 7131(b) (1982).
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management negotiators are reasonably equal, the negotiation
process will not achieve its intended purpose. Accordingly, Congress enacted section 7131 to guarantee that union negotiators are
given paid time off from their work duties to participate in the
negotiation process. The task of reasonable equalization begun by
Congress was encouraged by the FLRA's Interpretation, which
granted union negotiators the right to travel and per diem expenses associated with negotiation. However, the Supreme Court
inhibited the trend toward equalization by overruling the Interpretation in Bureau of Alcohol.
The significance of the Authority's ruling cannot be underestimated. Unlike their private sector counterparts, federal sector unions must engage in agency-wide negotiations, necessitating large
transportation costs. Moreover, the voluntary union security system prevalent in the federal sector yields less dues income to cover
such costs. Despite the obvious need for travel and per diem expenses, costs to taxpayers have been enormous, and are constantly
rising.
In Bureau of Alcohol, the Supreme Court apparently gave
greater sway to stark economic implications. The public interest
in effective labor negotiations, which was furthered by the FLRA,
was overriden by economic and policy considerations. Apparently, OPM carried this view to its extreme in FPM Letter
711-162 by effectively banning travel and per diem expense reimbursement in the federal sector. As a result of the Supreme
Court's ruling and OPM's interpretation, the FLRA and the
courts will be forced to address the travel and per diem issue once
again. Still, the statutory changes in official time found in the
Civil Service Reform Act will continue to exert a profound influence on federal sector collective bargaining.

